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 ANNEXATION AND THE MID-SIZE 
METROPOLIS: NEW INSIGHTS IN THE AGE OF 
MOBILE CAPITAL 
Christopher J. Tyson* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Metropolitan regions are led by their central cities. They want and need to 
grow, but the suburban sprawl and municipal fragmentation that growth produces 
stand in the way. Fragmentation handicaps the central city’s ability to effectively 
coordinate responses to regional issues. Mid-size regions are especially vulnerable 
to the effects of fragmentation, as they face unique economic development and 
sociological challenges. First, mid-size regions lack many of the assets necessary to 
compete globally for mobile capital. Second, social inequality plays out differently 
in mid-size regions, which are spatially constrained and have pervasive low-density 
land use patterns. Municipal boundaries reflect these divisions and determine who 
gets to participate in the redistribution of the community’s resources. Of the many 
urban policy options available for addressing these challenges, annexation is both 
the most potent and the most controversial. This article explores how the growth 
ambitions of mid-size central cities are affected by their respective state annexation 
regimes. The article examines annexation battles in Mississippi, Tennessee, and 
North Carolina to observe how different annexation regimes help or hinder mid-
size central cities. Ultimately the article finds that mid-size central cities need 
annexation regimes that help them to address social inequality while maximizing 
their economic competitiveness. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Every city wants to be larger. Not just for the sake of being larger, but 
because being larger almost always means more people, better employment 
opportunities, better lifestyle options, and higher property values. Standing in the 
way of municipal land growth, however, is urban sprawl.1 While sprawl relates to 
the territorial expansion of the city’s identity, it often occurs outside of a 
municipality’s borders. Sprawl outside of a municipality’s borders results both in 
the development of unincorporated enclaves within the metropolitan region, as well 
as the incorporation of new municipalities on the central city’s fringe. As these 
separate and autonomous local government units grow in number, they limit the 
central city’s growth options. The metropolitan region becomes fragmented, and 
municipal fragmentation can foster provincialism within the various jurisdictions.2 
Provincialism often thwarts regional cooperation, and a lack of cooperation 
can have grave implications for economic development and social relations 
throughout a metropolitan region.3 Metropolitan regions compete with each other 
for new businesses and residents.4 They all have specific land use, service delivery, 
and resource disparities, however, the effects of which can imperil economic 
development for the entire region. These disparities typically correspond with race 
and class dynamics in a manner that intensifies the geographic distribution of 
privilege and disadvantage. Local governments play a key role in marshaling 
regional assets to respond to competitive realities, yet increased fragmentation 
makes coordinating response efforts difficult. The more of the region’s land area 
                                                           
 
1 One of the many definitions for urban sprawl provides that sprawl occurs when metropolitan areas 
consume land for urbanization at a faster rate than they add population. See, e.g., WILLIAM FULTON ET 
AL., BROOKINGS INST. CTR. ON URBAN & METRO. POLICY, WHO SPRAWLS MOST? HOW GROWTH 
PATTERNS DIFFER ACROSS THE U.S. 2–4 (2001). Sprawl has also been described as “unplanned, 
uncontrolled, and uncoordinated single use development that does not provide for a functional mix of 
uses and/or is not functionally related to surrounding land uses and which variously appears as low-
density, ribbon or strip, scattered, leapfrog, or isolated development.” John I. Carruthers & Gudmundur 
F. Ulfarsson, Fragmentation and Sprawl: Evidence from Interregional Analysis, 33 GROWTH & 
CHANGE 312, 314 (2002) (quoting ARTHUR C. NELSON ET AL., GROWTH MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES 
AND PRACTICES (1995)). 
2 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 77–81 (1990); Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest and the Tyranny of the 
Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to the New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2014–15 (2000) 
(discussing the consequences of municipal fragmentation within a metropolitan region). 
3 See infra notes 110, 118 and accompanying text. 
4 See infra note 139 and accompanying text. 
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the central city controls, the better its chances of maximizing economic 
development throughout the region.5 
Mid-size regions are especially vulnerable to the effects of sprawl and intra-
regional municipal fragmentation. They face unique governance and economic 
development obstacles that are often underestimated or outright ignored in broader 
considerations of urban policy or local government law.6 Unlike large regions, 
most mid-size regions lack the critical mass of competitive credentials necessary 
for maximizing their economic development potential.7 This is further complicated 
by the realities of increasing global, inter-urban competition for mobile capital.8 
Geoeconomic forces are transforming the nature of economic development 
and the capital attraction strategies of metropolitan regions.9 Global inter-urban 
competition for mobile capital is a defining feature of municipal governance and a 
relatively high stakes game for mid-size regions.10 As regional anchors, mid-size 
central cities set the tone for their regions’ relative economic competitiveness. They 
must therefore be able to exercise leadership in establishing the preconditions for 
economic viability and growth. The proliferation of multiple local government 
units within a region disperses decision-making power over a range of entities and 
interests, complicating regional decision making. 
In addition to the impact on economic development efforts, in every 
metropolitan region there are sociological dimensions to the meaning and 
management of municipal boundaries. Boundaries are powerful social 
constructions mapped onto existing landscapes and given the force of law. They 
                                                           
 
5 See infra note 121 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra note 87 and accompanying text. 
7 Id. 
8 Mobile capital refers to the ability of corporations, firms, investors, and other conglomerations of 
private funds to move across national and regional borders in pursuit of higher investment returns. The 
problem of mobile capital is borne out by the phenomenon of capital flight, and the law and politics of 
local government is constituted by the ever-evolving relationship between cities and business. As local 
governments and metropolitan regions position themselves to compete for mobile capital, they 
participate in a global competition that pits metropolitan region against metropolitan region. See, e.g., 
Richard Briffault, Our Localism Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 421–22 
(1990) (discussing the relative mobility of capital in shaping inter-local competition); Richard C. 
Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic City, 123 HARV. L. REV. 
482, 487–88 (2009). 
9 See infra note 126 and accompanying text. 
10 See, e.g., Schragger, supra note 8, at 488–92. 
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determine who gets to participate in the redistribution of the community’s 
resources. Race and class stratification is in many ways a result of the formation 
and reformation of municipal boundaries. The large metropolitan region is often the 
default frame for understanding these dynamics. This stratification takes on 
different dimensions, however, in mid-size regions, where different race and class 
groups exist in relatively spatially constrained, yet low-density, land use patterns.11 
Of the many urban policy options available for addressing these challenges, 
annexation is one of the most controversial. Annexation, the process through which 
municipalities extend their boundaries to envelop outlying unincorporated areas, is 
the most frequently utilized method for boundary adjustment and municipal land 
area growth.12 Despite its guiding role in urban policy, annexation is seldom 
viewed as an essential component of a comprehensive metropolitan economic 
development strategy.13 Municipalities often pursue annexation on an ad hoc basis 
for development activity in unincorporated areas that will enhance their tax base, 
such as building office parks and shopping centers. Annexation activity originating 
out of these situations is different from its inclusion in a broader, comprehensive 
economic development strategy.14 
A state’s annexation law is an important and often under-appreciated 
expression of its land use policy. While there are many drivers of economic 
competitiveness and social stratification, land use plays an important role. In the 
Brookings Institute Report, Annexation and the Fiscal State of Cities, David Rusk 
quantifies the relationship between boundary elasticity and municipal economic 
well-being.15 According to Rusk, state annexation regimes that facilitate maximum 
                                                           
 
11 See infra note 107 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra note 65. 
13 While some texts on economic development reference municipal boundaries, none explicitly 
incorporates boundary expansion as part of a broader economic development strategy. See, e.g., WASH. 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: GROWTH MANAGEMENT’S MISSING LINK (2002); 
CORP. FOR ENTER. DEV., STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: MOVING BEYOND THE 
OVERALL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (1999). 
14 Annexation is a broad issue with implications for a range of local government units, related issues, 
and core functions. See, e.g., Mary M. Edwards, Understanding the Complexities of Annexation, 23 J. 
PLANNING LITERATURE 119 (2008). While this author is aware of the many dimensions and 
considerations associated with municipal annexation, this article will focus on the relationship between a 
state’s annexation regime and the manner in which it impacts the economic development challenges 
faced by mid-size metropolitan regions. 
15 DAVID RUSK, BROOKINGS INST. METRO. POLICY PROGRAM, ANNEXATION AND THE FISCAL FATE OF 
CITIES (2006). 
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central city boundary elasticity are likely to enhance the fiscal position and, by 
extension, economic competitiveness of their metropolitan regions. This holds 
specific relevance for the central cities of mid-size metropolitan regions for which 
the consequences of fragmentation and sprawl more acutely affect economic 
development and social relations. 
The fate of mid-size metropolitan regions is tied in large measure to their 
ability to reconcile intra-regional municipal fragmentation with increasing global 
inter-urban competition for mobile capital. Annexation battles in several states 
illustrate this well. While North Carolina’s annexation laws have recently 
undergone substantial change, for more than fifty years the state has had the 
nation’s most pro-central city annexation regime. Mississippi, on the other hand, 
has seen its largest central city anchor, Jackson, choked by sprawl and stifled by its 
relatively thin annexation regime. North Carolina and Mississippi represent 
opposite ends of the annexation policy spectrum. Neither is a perfect model. Both 
show how, if incorporated into a broader metropolitan economic development plan, 
annexation can be a critical tool in boosting the economic competitiveness of mid-
size metropolitan regions. 
Part I of this article reviews the historical development and the sociopolitical 
impact of annexation policy. Part II defines and contextualizes the mid-size 
metropolis for the purpose of illuminating the economic development and 
governance challenges at the core of its identity. Part III explores how the growth 
ambitions of Mississippi’s, Tennessee’s, and North Carolina’s mid-size central 
cities are affected by their respective annexation regimes. The article concludes by 
exploring policy innovations for enhancing the potency of annexation regimes in 
states with predominately mid-size metropolitan regions. 
PART I: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION 
Scholars in several disciplines have long explored the politics, sociology, and 
law of municipal boundary formation and reformation.16 Urban historian Kenneth 
Jackson opined: “[W]ithout exception, the adjustment of local boundaries has been 
the dominant method of population growth in every American city of 
                                                           
 
16 See, e.g., Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 931 (2010); 
Amanda K. Baumle et al., Strategic Annexation Under the Voting Rights Act: Racial Dimensions of 
Annexation Practices, 24 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 81 (2008); Elizabeth R. Connolly, Bargain 
Basement Annexation: How Municipalities Subvert the Intent of North Carolina Annexation Laws, 29 
N.C. CENT. L.J. 77 (2006); Edwards, supra note 14; Clayton P. Gillette, Voting with Your Hands: Direct 
Democracy in Annexation, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 835 (2005); Rex L. Facer, Annexation Activity and State 
Law in the United States, 41 URB. AFFAIRS REV. 697 (2006). 
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consequence.”17 Annexation regimes are a significant area of state and local 
government law affecting the ability of cities to respond to population shifts and 
development demands within a metropolitan region. They are also powerful tools 
in the quest to control and limit sprawl in America’s metropolitan regions. 
Annexation laws are not controlled by the federal government, however, making 
the development and application of a broad national standard impossible.18 
State annexation policy has evolved considerably over the past century. 
Forcible annexation was the predominant doctrine in the states during the 
nineteenth century. It ensured that no small territory would be allowed to retard the 
development of the metropolitan community.19 As suburban development grew, 
state legislatures began redefining the legal concept of a city to include suburbs, 
liberalizing municipal incorporation laws, and placing new restrictions on the 
abilities of central cities to expand.20 
The rise of localism coincided with the rise of city power.21 Many 
contemporary notions of the city and city power have their roots in the causes of 
the Progressive Era, particularly with regard to municipal government reform.22 
Around the turn of the twentieth century, both policy makers and jurists alike were 
concerned that with the national government and economy rapidly growing in size, 
                                                           
 
17 See KENNETH JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 140 
(1985). 
18 While annexation law is the province of state government, certain states must have annexations pre-
cleared by the United States Justice Department under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. See 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006). 
19 See JACKSON, supra note 17, at 147. 
20 See Briffault, supra note 8, at 357–64 (discussing the social and demographic changes that influenced 
the evolution of the legal classification of suburbs and the manner in which it has limited the ability of 
metropolitan region central cities to grow). 
21 For a definition of “localism,” see infra note 123 and accompanying text. 
22 The Progressive Era in the United States was a period of reform that flourished from the 1890s to the 
1920s. While the era is known for its innovative approaches to government and urban policy, the 
Progressive Era was also marked by the growth of racism and colonialism. Progressives drew support 
primarily from the middle class, and supporters included many lawyers, teachers, physicians, ministers, 
and businesspeople. Progressives sought to keep corruption out of politics and many Progressives 
successfully exposed and undercut political machines and bosses. Their governmental reform efforts 
were focused on waste and the delivery of public services by city and state governments. Their efforts 
led to the development of a more structured system and more localized power. Changes were made to 
local government to make legal processes, market transactions, bureaucratic administration, and 
democracy easier to manage, thus giving birth to municipal administration. See, e.g., STEVEN J. DINER, 
A VERY DIFFERENT AGE: AMERICANS OF THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1998). 
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scope, and sophistication, the specter of unregulated and unfettered local power 
threatened to create a disastrous maze of conflicting and contradictory local laws, 
customs, and regulations that would ultimately frustrate national objectives.23 
Conflicts over state and local power were settled in Hunter v. City of 
Pittsburgh.24 In Hunter, the Supreme Court effectively settled the notion that there 
is any federally protected right to local self-government and solidified the status of 
cities as merely creatures of state law.25 The case and the developments in local 
                                                           
 
23 See Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1066–67 (1980). 
24 207 U.S. 161 (1907). 
25 The lack of any substantive right to local self-government is the foundational principal of local 
government law and is essential to understanding the state’s role in shaping boundary formation and 
reformation policy. See id. at 178–79 (“Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, 
created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be 
entrusted to them. For the purpose of executing these powers properly and efficiently they usually are 
given the power to acquire, hold, and manage personal and real property. The number, nature and 
duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which they shall be 
exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State. Neither their charters, nor any law conferring 
governmental powers, or vesting in them property to be used for governmental purposes, or authorizing 
them to hold or manage such property, or exempting them from taxation upon it, constitutes a contract 
with the State within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. The State, therefore, at its pleasure may 
modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or 
vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with 
another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally 
or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest.”); see also 
Briffault, supra note 2, at 7–8 (“As a matter of conventional legal theory, the states enjoy complete 
hegemony over local governments. Under both federal and state constitutional law, local governments 
have no rights against their states. Localities may not assert the contracts clause, the equal protection 
clause or the privileges and immunities clause against their state governments. Nor do the residents of 
local governments have any inherent right to local self-government: local residents may not assert a 
constitutional claim to belong to a particular local government or to have any local government at all. 
The formal legal status of a local government in relation to its state is summarized by the three concepts 
of ‘creature,’ ‘delegate’ and ‘agent.’ The local government is a creature of the state. It exists only by an 
act of the state, and the state, as creator, has plenary power to alter, expand, contract or abolish at will 
any or all local units. The local government is a delegate of the state, possessing only those powers the 
state has chosen to confer upon it. Absent any specific limitation in the state constitution, the state can 
amend, abridge or retract any power it has delegated, much as it can impose new duties or take away old 
privileges. The local government is an agent of the state, exercising limited powers at the local level on 
behalf of the state. A local government is like a state administrative agency, serving the state in its 
narrow area of expertise, but instead of being functional specialists, localities are given jurisdictions 
primarily by territory, although certain local units are specialized by function as well as territory.”) 
(internal citations and formatting omitted). 
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government law that followed marked a considerable shift in the legal conception 
of both the city and the suburb in American urban policy.26 
Over time, many states have moved away from annexation regimes that 
expand central city power and toward systems that subject central cities to 
restraints and conditions that safeguard the prerogatives of suburban jurisdictions. 
Some states have effectively foreclosed the option for their municipalities to 
expand their boundaries. For instance, throughout New England, New York, New 
Jersey, and Pennsylvania, all territory is divided among a myriad of cities, villages, 
boroughs, towns, or townships, and there is no unincorporated land.27 Other states 
have annexation laws that are seldom used because the relative strength of their 
unincorporated townships and other areas make it difficult for central cities to 
annex them.28 
The methods for annexation commonly found in state law can be divided into 
five categories: popular determination, municipal action (ordinance or resolution), 
legislative determination, quasi-legislative determination (regional or statewide 
boundary review commissions), and judicial determination. States with popular 
determination allow the affected members of the electorate, property owners, area 
residents, or some combination thereof to determine if a boundary change will be 
enacted. States with municipal determination allow the municipality to unilaterally 
extend its boundaries. Most states combine several of these methods to provide 
both cities and residents with various alternatives and a range of options to choose 
from.29 The result is a great deal of variation across the states regarding municipal 
annexation. 
                                                           
 
26 See, e.g., Kenneth Stahl, The Suburb as a Legal Concept: The Problem of Organization and the Fate 
of Municipalities in American Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1193 (2008) (discussing the historical 
relationship between cities and the socioeconomic and political factors fueling the development of the 
twentieth-century suburb); Wayne Batchis, Enabling Urban Sprawl: Revisiting the Supreme Court’s 
Seminal Zoning Decision Euclid v. Ambler in the 21st Century, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 373 (2010) 
(discussing Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926), and its impact on the development of 
suburban sprawl and the historical nexus between suburban development and center city decline). 
27 See RUSK, supra note 15, at 7. 
28 For the relevant annexation regimes within each state under Rusk’s classification, see 65 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/7-1-1 (2011); IND. CODE § 36-4-3 (2011); IOWA CODE § 368.7 (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-
519 (2011); MO. REV. STAT. § 71.014 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-117 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 40-51.2 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 9-4-1 (2011); WIS. STAT. § 66.0217 (2011). 
29 See, e.g., FRANK D. SENGSTOCK, ANNEXATION: A SOLUTION TO THE METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEM 
(Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. ed. 1960); RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 211 (7th ed. 2009). 
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Many states attach conditions to the annexation process that can severely 
inhibit a municipality’s ability to expand. Thirty-four states allow the annexation 
process to be initiated by a petition of property owners in the areas to be annexed.30 
In nine of these states, annexation can be initiated only by property owner petition, 
a limitation that puts central city expansion in the hands of suburban developers 
and residents.31 Fourteen states require the approval of the affected voters.32 Eleven 
states require that the affected county government must approve any municipal 
annexation.33 Twenty-nine states provide for an election in the area to be annexed 
at some point in the annexation process.34 Annexations that require the approval of 
a majority vote of the residents or property owners in the area proposed for 
annexation complicate municipal expansion plans by placing all power over 
boundary change in the hands of those of who may have deliberately fled the 
central city and are therefore likely opposed to its expansion. 
Involuntary annexation provisions allow municipalities to unilaterally expand 
their boundaries. Affected landowners often have little or no right to dissent as long 
as the annexing body complies with the strict geographical and developmental 
criteria and procedures set forth in the statutory requirements.35 States that allow 
involuntary annexation include Indiana,36 Kansas,37 Kentucky,38 Nebraska,39 
Tennessee,40 and Texas.41 
Annexation is controversial and often leads to litigation. Annexation battles 
typically involve one of two contexts: when neighboring municipalities are 
competing for the same land area or when a municipality seeks to annex land from 
                                                           
 
30 See DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS: A CENSUS 2000 UPDATE 108 (Woodrow Wilson Plaza 
ed., 3d ed. 2003). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 108–09. 
33 Id. 
34 See Edwards, supra note 14, at 124. 
35 See, e.g., Connolly, supra note 16, at 82. 
36 IND. CODE ANN. § 36-4-3-3 et seq. (2011). 
37 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-520(a) et seq. (2011). 
38 See KRS § 81.100 et seq. (2012). 
39 See NEB. REV. STAT. § 14-117 et seq. (2012). 
40 TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-58-111(a) et seq. (2011). 
41 See TEX. LOCAL GOV’T CODE § 43.033 et seq. (West 2012). 
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its unincorporated environs.42 Those opposing annexations almost always include 
the landowners, businesses, and residents of the unincorporated area proposed for 
annexation, and sometimes residents of the county in whose borders the area falls. 
These groups are the most directly affected by proposed annexations. Annexations 
will likely result in a change to their tax liabilities or result in fee increases. 
Additionally, newly annexed residents may oppose the city’s political regime.43 
Opposition may also reflect the race and class politics of the metropolitan region. 
Suburban dwellers have traditionally been white and middle class, with their flight 
to the suburbs driven by a mix of factors that, together, have spurred suburban 
expansion and defined the modern suburban identity.44 
In Cities without Suburbs: The 2000 Census Update, David Rusk makes the 
observation that around the middle of the twentieth century, “Washington, Wall 
Street, Detroit, Hollywood, and Madison Avenue” introduced the American middle 
class to a revision of the American dream that fundamentally reorganized land use 
and metropolitan organization and governance.45 The physical landscape of the 
metropolitan region and the distribution of neighborhoods, shopping areas, 
business districts, prosperity, and poverty are all the cumulative result of specific 
federal, state, and local policy decisions that developed from historical events, 
social processes, and economic forces. These forces have redefined the look, 
experience, and meaning of metropolitan space. They have resulted in the selective 
concentration of social activity and employment opportunities in a manner that has 
led to social polarization, spatial imbalances, and fragmented, uncoordinated 
government.46 
In light of this history, urban sprawl cannot be attributed to just the 
cumulative impact of population growth, technology, or the lure of the suburbs. It 
is not just a rational rejection of city life, city politics, or urbanity. Urban sprawl 
                                                           
 
42 See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 29, at 211. 
43 See Edwards, supra note 14, at 127–29. 
44 See infra note 48 and accompanying text. 
45 See RUSK, supra note 30, at 7. 
46 See, e.g., Batchis, supra note 26, at 379–83 (discussing the role of exclusionary zoning in the 
development of urban sprawl); Audrey G. McFarlane, Rebuilding the Public-Private City: Regulatory 
Taking’s Anti-Subordination Insights for Eminent Domain and Redevelopment, 42 IND. L. REV. 97, 
118–34 (2009) (discussing race and class subordination in redevelopment); John A. Powell & 
Marguerite L. Spencer, Giving Them the Old “One-Two”: Gentrification and the K.O. of Impoverished 
Urban Dwellers of Color, 46 HOW. L.J. 433, 436–48 (2003) (discussing the race, class, and spatial 
forces driving gentrification). 
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reflects developments in the socio-cultural construction of the modern American 
middle class, the race and class struggles of the twentieth century, the massive 
federal subsidization of suburban growth policies, and exclusionary zoning.47 The 
confluence of these forces substantially redefined the meaning and experience of 
American life in a manner that transformed metropolitan regions by promoting, 
provoking, and facilitating an initial wave of white flight and a subsequent wave of 
multi-racial middle class flight that has decimated the tax base and urban core of 
metropolitan region central cities.48 This flight is quantifiable: in 1950, almost 
seventy percent of the population of 168 metropolitan regions lived in 193 central 
cities; by 2000, over sixty percent of the population of 331 metropolitan regions 
lived in suburbs.49 Over the same period, population density in 157 of those 
urbanized areas was effectively cut in half.50 
The only central cities that added population during the past five decades 
without expanding their boundaries were Miami; San Francisco; Elizabeth and 
Patterson, New Jersey; and New York City.51 The states whose annexation regimes 
facilitate frequent municipal annexations of substantial landmasses are mostly 
                                                           
 
47 See RUSK, supra note 30, at 24–25 (discussing DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, 
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993)) and JACKSON, 
supra note 17, at 195–203 (The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, which provided low-interest, long-
term mortgage loans to financially struggling families created a neighborhood rating system that 
“redlined” predominately black neighborhoods, denying loans to families in those areas. The residential 
security maps that redlined black neighborhoods for disinvestment were regularly used by private banks 
for their lending practices and were embraced by the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans 
Administration when they were founded in 1937 and 1944, respectively.). 
48 For a discussion of the causes and consequences of white suburban flight, see, e.g., Kyle Crowder, 
The Racial Context of White Mobility: An Individual-Level Assessment of the White Flight Hypothesis, 
29 SOC. SCI. RES. 223 (2000) (presenting research that indicates that the likelihood of Whites leaving a 
neighborhood increases significantly with the size of the minority population in the neighborhood and 
that Whites are especially likely to leave neighborhoods containing combinations of multiple minority 
groups); George C. Galster, White Flight from Racially Integrated Neighborhoods in the 1970s: The 
Cleveland Experience, 27 URB. STUD. 385, 391 (1990) (presenting econometric research indicating that 
segregationist sentiment was a primary driver in white emigration from racially integrated 
neighborhoods); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS 25–50 (1996) (discussing the 
various factors characterizing the development of an isolated and economically disadvantaged ghetto 
underclass); see also generally BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE CHANGING FACE OF THE SUBURBS (1976). 
49 RUSK, supra note 30, at 5. 
50 Id. at 8. 
51 RUSK, supra note 15, at 6. 
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found in the nation’s Sun Belt region.52 These states are where annexation activity 
has been the most frequent.53 Twenty-seven states have experienced significant 
annexation in the past twenty years due to aggressive expansions by their central 
cities.54 These twenty-seven states include almost all of the Sun Belt states, where 
population growth has been the steadiest and where most of the nation’s growing 
mid-sized metropolitan regions are located.55 Their growth has undoubtedly 
allowed them to develop the infrastructure, population base, and economic 
preconditions necessary to enhance their economic competitiveness.56 
The process of annexing territory is part of complicated reality of the meaning 
and function of municipal boundaries. Municipal boundaries are deliberate 
signifiers of cultural, social, and political identity in a community. They demarcate 
who is within and outside of a community and consequently who is entitled to 
participate in the redistribution of the community’s wealth through public services 
and infrastructure. They reflect the nation’s and the local community’s legacy of 
race and class struggles and are as much of a reflection of those identity constructs 
                                                           
 
52 See RUSK, supra note 15, at App. B (showing hyper-elastic and high-elastic cities almost exclusively 
located in sun-belt states, including Arizona, Nevada, Texas, North Carolina, Tennessee, Florida, New 
Mexico, Arkansas, South Carolina, and Alabama). 
53 See Colin C. Rice, Factors Contributing to Frequency of Municipal Annexation among Medium-sized 
Southern U.S. Cities 49–50 (2008) (unpublished M.P.A. thesis, Texas State University-San Marcos), 
http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/281. 
54 Rusk classifies these twenty-seven states as “big box” states. For the relevant regimes under the “big 
box” classification, see ALA. CODE § 11-42-1 (2011); ALASKA STAT. § 29.06.040 (2011); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 9-471 (2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-40-201 (2011); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 56017 (West 
2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-12-107 (2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 101 (2011); FLA. STAT. 
§ 171.011 (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-36-1 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-222 (2011); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 81a.005 (West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:151 (2011); MD. CODE ANN., art. 23a, 
§ 19 (West 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 21-1-27 (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-2-4201 (2011); NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 268.570 (2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-7-1 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160a-45 (2011); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 21-102 (2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 222.111 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 5-3-110, 
repealed by An Act to Reform the Involuntary Annexation Laws of North Carolina 2011 N.C. SESS. 
LAWS 396; TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-51-102 (2011); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 43.001 (West 2011); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 10-2-401.5 (West 2011); W.VA. CODE § 8-6-1 (2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 15-1-401 
(2011). 
55 A survey of the top 366 metropolitan regions in the United States with populations of between one 
half million and two million reveals that the majority of the areas are located in the South, Western 
Plains, and West Coast states. They developed primarily after the advent of the automobile and, in many 
cases, after the development of the interstate highway system. See infra note 79. 
56 Annexation served as the primary method of boundary growth for many metropolitan regions in the 
Sun Belt including: Houston, TX; Dallas, TX; San Antonio, TX; Phoenix, AZ. See Gerald E. Frug, 
Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763, 1766–73 (2002) (discussing annexation as a 
method of city building). 
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as racial and socio-economic classifications themselves.57 Scholars have found that 
the more a region is fragmented into multiple governments or municipal identities, 
the more racially and economically segregated its housing market is and the slower 
its rate of regional economic growth.58 Intra-regional fragmentation both originates 
from and exacerbates existing social stratification and weak economic growth 
profiles. 
Past motives for annexation have often intentionally served to reproduce 
preceding race and class inequalities. Annexations have, in many instances, been 
influenced by racial motives, carving metropolitan regions into racially and 
socioeconomically defined local government units.59 Municipal under-bounding—
annexation practices in which cities grow around or away from low-income 
minority communities in an effort to exclude them from municipal services and 
curtail their voting rights—has occurred in a number of states and is currently 
being challenged in the courts.60 
                                                           
 
57 Numerous scholars have documented the lineage and effects of America’s race- and class-conscious 
urban public policy, its relationship to the decline of central cities and the development and expansion of 
the modern American suburb, and the challenges it presents for the future organization of metropolitan 
regional politics and economic development. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 16, at 935–37 (discussing 
the history of race and class influences on boundary construction); Cashin, supra note 2, at 2027–33 
(discussing New Regionalism and the impact of local power in the reproduction of regional race, class 
and resource allocation disparities); Stahl, supra note 26 (discussing the class consciousness associated 
with suburban development and its relationship to zoning and notions of local autonomy in local 
government law). 
58 See RUSK, supra note 15, at 2 (citing DAVID Y. MILLER, THE REGIONAL GOVERNING OF 
METROPOLITAN AMERICA 126–28 (2002)). 
59 See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 16 (discussing different theories and approaches to understanding the 
methodology of annexation and specifically promoting concurrent majorities as a method for conducting 
annexations); Anderson, supra note 16, at 937–41 (discussing municipal under-bounding as a 
motivation for annexation and as a reflection of the race and class dimensions of municipal boundary 
construction); Baumle et al., supra note 16 (discussing the role of annexation in diluting the weight of 
the votes of individuals who were in the city boundaries prior to annexation). 
60 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 16, at 940. In Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Ohio found, on a motion for summary judgment, that a jury could 
conclude that the city’s reasons for not providing public water to a group of African-American residents 
was based on pre-textual racial discrimination. 505 F. Supp. 2d 456, 498 (S.D. Ohio 2007). In 
Committee Concerning Community Improvement v. City of Modesto, the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of California dismissed discrimination claims asserted by residents of a Latino 
community and two civic groups based on a lack of public service provisions from the city of Modesto 
California on a motion for summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court in regard to 
plaintiffs’ claims under a Master Tax Sharing Agreement and the Fair Housing Act. The Ninth Circuit 
also reversed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ state law claims as well as the district court’s 
award of costs to the defendants. 583 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 2009). The case is currently on remand in the 
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Various scholars’ calls for increased annexation to address municipal under-
bounding reflect the negative consequences of fragmentation for historically 
marginalized communities and the risks posed by annexation for community 
residents.61 Because of statutory requirements and local government practice, 
proposed annexations must always consider the fiscal impact of a boundary 
expansion.62 This analysis requires weighing the proposed annexation’s service 
costs and revenue benefits. This utilitarian approach can mask race and class 
animus, ultimately disadvantaging lower income or minority unincorporated areas 
that lack an attractive property or retail tax base.63 
Race and class bias in annexation reflect deeper conflicts located at the 
intersection of property rights and redistribution. Just as private property 
boundaries grant the individual the right to exclude others from the bundle of rights 
and social, political, and economic benefits tied to private property, city boundaries 
also serve an exclusionary function by determining who gets to participate in the 
redistribution of a community’s resources. When applied to the role of municipal 
boundaries in shaping notions of community, the exclusionary features of private 
property ownership are elevated as the essential features worthy of attention and 
protection. This leads to a crisis of political discourse where notions of private 
property rights are expressed through the formation and reformation of municipal 
boundaries. 
Frank Sengstock began his 1960 book, Annexation: A Solution to the 
Metropolitan Problem, with the contention that “[t]he outstanding demographic 
characteristic of the twentieth century United States is the intensive development of 
metropolitan areas unrestrained by local political boundaries.”64 As the twenty-first 
century unfolds, the implications of Sengstock’s observations are clear in the land 
                                                                                                                                      
 
Eastern District of California and undergoing pre-trial preparation. See Comm. Concerning Cmty. 
Improvement v. City of Modesto, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13774 (E.D. Cal. 2011). 
61 See Anderson, supra note 16, at 938–42. 
62 See Edwards, supra note 14, at 127–29. 
63 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 16, at 944–59; Connolly, supra note 16, at 82–85 (discussing the 
selective annexation of wealthy areas and the exclusion of poorer areas with high minority populations 
in recent North Carolina annexation cases); Edwards, supra note 14, at 123 (citing D. Andrew Austin, 
Politics vs. Economics: Evidence from Municipal Annexation, 45 J. URB. ECON. 501 (1999) (discussing 
empirical analysis that suggests that the fiscal motive of capturing additional tax base did not necessarily 
drive annexation decisions and that, while decision-makers do not necessarily pick and choose amongst 
census tracts to minimize nonwhites included in an annexation, results do show that decision-makers 
used annexation to increase the proportion of white voters and dilute minority voting power)). 
64 SENGSTOCK, supra note 29, at 1. 
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use and demographic characteristics of American metropolitan regions. Annexation 
remains the dominant driver of municipal expansion.65 A half century of suburban 
growth politics, however, has undermined the public’s understanding of 
annexation.66 Annexation is now widely perceived as a threat to individual liberty 
and autonomous self-government, pitting metropolitan region residents against 
metropolitan region central city governments.67 
A more useful frame for conceptualizing annexation policy recognizes its 
potential to both strengthen regional economic development efforts and curb the 
continued growth in race and class stratification. This potential is even greater for 
mid-size metropolitan regions. These regions face unique economic development 
challenges that arise out of a fundamentally distinct set of historical and urban 
development realities that separate them from large metropolitan regions.68 While 
large metropolitan regions have many tools to lure and retain mobile capital, mid-
size metropolitan regions typically have less leverage and therefore must reconsider 
central city expansion and the organization of metropolitan governance through 
annexation. 
PART II: THE MID-SIZE METROPOLIS AND THE ANNEXATION 
IMPERATIVE 
In order to fully comprehend annexation’s potential for bolstering the 
economic competitiveness of mid-size regions, it is necessary to investigate the 
relationship between boundary elasticity and economic competitiveness. First, it is 
necessary to define exactly what constitutes a mid-size metropolitan region and 
how it differs from its larger counterparts. This examination must consider the 
relatively diminished competitive capacity of mid-size regions in the context of the 
                                                           
 
65 Boundary expansion was the largest driver of municipal expansion in the second half of the twentieth 
century, with almost four-fifths of 521 central cities expanding their boundaries by ten percent or more 
between 1950 and 2000. For the decade between 1970 and 1979, municipalities undertook over 61,000 
annexations and about the same number for the fifteen-year period from 1990 to 2005. Edwards, supra 
note 14, at 119. During the 1990s, 348 of 400 central cities that could annex property did. RUSK, supra 
note 30, at 108. 
66 See Briffault, supra note 8, at 357–66. 
67 Whether or not pro-municipality annexation policies are inherently oppositional to individual property 
rights is a topic that deserves a more robust treatment than this article is concerned with. See, e.g., 
Gillette, supra note 16; RUSK, supra note 30, at 108–10 (arguing that annexation laws have an impact 
on a city’s flexibility); Laurie Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, 24 URB. LAW. 247, 
250, 258–71 (1992) (arguing that involuntary annexation power is necessary for all municipal 
government). 
68 See infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
A N N E X A T I O N  A N D  T H E  M I D - S I Z E  M E T R O P O L I S   
 
P A G E  |  5 2 1   
 
ever-intensifying pressures on metropolitan capital attraction efforts. Lastly, this 
examination must explore the specific challenges mid-size regions face in resolving 
global inter-urban competition with their historically low level or lack of 
participation in that competition. 
A. Metropolitanization and Defining the Mid-Size Metropolis 
All cities are not created equal, and mid-size metropolitan regions receive 
scant attention in urban policy analysis. Few scholars have explored the 
distinctiveness of mid-size metropolitan regions or the substantive policy 
considerations that emanate from that distinctiveness.69 Mid-size metropolitan 
regions face many of the same growth and global competitiveness challenges as 
their larger counterparts, yet generally with less intensity and fewer available 
resources.70 In most cases they lack the image, economic and population diversity, 
and the real and perceived quality of life advantages that large urban regions have 
in abundance.71 
Large metropolitan regions are the dominant frame of reference for 
discussions of metropolitanization, urban complexity, and urban policy innovation. 
They are the conceptual center from which most urban-related knowledge is 
developed and critiqued.72 Large metropolitan central cities are internationally 
known for their distinct identities, histories, architecture, and culture. They are 
destinations that leverage their scale to attract and develop a range of resources that 
                                                           
 
69 The scholarship on mid-size cities and metropolitan regions reveals varying definitions of “mid-size.” 
There is a broad recognition in the scholarship of the mid-size city/region’s largely ignored and 
undervalued distinctiveness relative to its larger counterparts and the general lack of attention this has 
received in scholarship. See generally Pierre Filion & Trudi Bunting, Exploring Policy Implications of 
Metropolitan Size: Accounting for the Mid-Size Urban Area, in GOVERNING METROPOLISES: PROFILES 
OF ISSUES AND EXPERIMENTS ON FOUR CONTINENTS 87 (Jean-Pierre Collin & Mélanie Robertson eds., 
2007); Trudi Bunting et al., Density, Size, Dispersion: Towards Understanding the Structural Dynamics 
of Mid-Size Cities, 16 CANADIAN J. URB. RES. 27, 46 (2007) (“Mid-size cities suffer from a scarcity of 
planning models suited to their particular circumstances, in part because there has been little recognition 
of their distinctive status.”). 
70 For a definition of mid-size metropolitan regions and large metropolitan regions, see infra note 79 and 
accompanying text. 
71 Ethnic and racial diversity is primarily prevalent in large metropolitan areas. See U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 31 tbl. 23 (2012), available at 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0023.pdf. 
72 See generally NEAL R. PEIRCE, CITISTATES: HOW URBAN AMERICA CAN PROSPER IN A COMPETITIVE 
WORLD (1993). See also Filion & Bunting, supra note 69, at 106 (discussing a ten-year survey from the 
Journal of the American Planning Association that revealed that a majority of the cities cited belonged 
to metropolitan regions with populations greater than one million). 
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contribute to their quality of life and livability. In addition to physical scale, they 
have the advantage of symbolic scale—the scale of history and cultural narrative. 
They are repositories of urban history, the impact and import of which stretches far 
beyond their boundaries. 
Large metropolitan regions also have a concentration of business and industry 
and the magnetic draw of a diverse, dynamic, and youthful population. Their 
geographic position and climate profile, historic patterns in the development of 
interstate commerce and transportation systems and embedded cultural economies, 
and their symbolic significance within larger narratives of community and identity 
make them well positioned to satisfy the tastes and preferences of twenty-first 
century life.73 
New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and others have well-
developed cultural identities that serve as powerful leverage for the economic 
development aims of their metropolitan regions.74 Their relative concentration of 
population, culture, firms, and infrastructure validate their position as global cities 
and make them magnets for global firms seeking durable preconditions for 
economic growth.75 These assets have developed over time and amount to legacy 
factors that endow large metropolitan regions with a critical mass of competitive 
credentials. These credentials serve as powerful leverage for their competitive 
positioning. Ultimately, large metropolitan regions have many options for 
reconciling the ever-unfolding dynamics of inter-urban competition for mobile 
capital with fragmentation and the challenges of metropolitan economic 
development coordination. 
Given these observations, the impact of intra-regional fragmentation takes on 
a different character in mid-size regions than in large regions.76 As municipalities 
                                                           
 
73 See, e.g., Mario Polèse, Why Big Cities Matter More than Ever: Seven Reasons, 20 CITY J., No. 4, 
2010, available at http://www.city-journal.org/2010/20_4_big-cities.html. 
74 The development of these cultural identities are deliberate and are part of the way in which cities and 
metropolitan regions market and promote themselves, primarily for tourism, which presents 
considerable revenue-generating opportunities for municipalities and their businesses. These efforts are 
known as “place branding.” Place branding “refers to the broad set of efforts by country, regional and 
city governments, and by industry groups, aimed at marketing the places and sectors they represent” for 
the purpose of “attract[ing] or retain[ing] factors of development and generally position[ing] the place 
for [more] advantage[ous] domestic[] and international[] [positioning] in economic, political and social 
terms.” Nicolas Papadopoulos, Place Branding: Evolution, Meaning and Implications, 1 PLACE 
BRANDING 36, 36–37 (2004). 
75 See generally Erla Zwingle, Megacities, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Nov. 2002, at 70. 
76 See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 8. Briffault discusses how the mobility of people in a multiplicity of 
localities in a metropolitan region can erode the capacity of most cities to undertake new programs that 
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of all sizes wrestle with crumbling infrastructure, unfunded pension liabilities, and 
tax bases diminished by decades of suburban flight, the physical, economic, and 
symbolic advantages of large urban regions can tip the scales of relative success 
and survival. These challenges are magnified for mid-size regions relative to their 
capacity for competing for mobile capital. 
Mid-size metropolitan regions often do not possess the same status, cultural 
profile, economic base, and critical mass of legacy factors as large metropolitan 
regions. They often lack the leverage to compete in an increasingly high-stakes 
inter-urban or inter-municipal competition for mobile capital.77 The unique 
challenges that stem from their economic structure, urban form, built environment, 
quality of life, and governance are of sufficient magnitude as to require separate 
consideration in urban studies and in local government law. 
There are various methods of defining what qualifies as a mid-size 
metropolitan region, and it is possible to overstate the importance of size, given 
that metropolitan regions confront many of the challenges that, regardless of scale, 
require the same types of skills and resources to address.78 This author’s definition 
of a mid-size metropolitan region focuses on those regions in the United States 
with populations between one half million and two million. Metropolitan regions 
within this band are distinctly different from regions with populations less than one 
half million or those with more than two million.79 
                                                                                                                                      
 
would impose costs on already strained local budgets. Additionally, the expansion of public services 
will likely be perceived to benefit the poor, racial minorities or municipal workers at the expense of 
higher tax-paying individuals and businesses. In mid-size cities, the combination of higher race and 
class polarization and relatively undeveloped economic bases only exacerbates the dynamics Briffault 
describes. 
77 See id. 
78 Various studies offer customized definitions of what constitutes a mid-size metropolitan region. 
Methods differ depending upon the objective of a particular study. See, e.g., Filion & Bunting, supra 
note 69, at 88–89 (defining mid-size as between 100,000 and 500,000). 
79 Metropolitan regions with populations less than one half million tend to consist of small cities and 
towns, with smaller satellite towns comprising a total metropolitan region. These metropolitan regions 
include those of Spokane, Washington; Flint, Michigan; Shreveport, Louisiana; Erie, Pennsylvania; 
Charlottesville, Virginia; and Santa Fe, New Mexico. See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 366 
METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2010), available at 
http://www.census.gov/population/metro. Metropolitan regions with populations greater than two 
million tend to consist of large, symbolic, well-branded metropolitan regions that, because of their scale 
and legacy factors, have a wide diversity of people and firms. These regions include those of New York, 
New York; Houston, Texas; Washington, DC; Denver, Colorado; and Cincinnati, Ohio. For reference, 
the April 1, 2010, update of the United States Office of Management and Budget’s ranking of the top 
366 MSAs lists twenty-nine metropolitan regions with populations of more than two million, 
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The United States Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has developed 
and manages an index of metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) that ranks 
metropolitan regions according to population size and gives definition to the 
municipalities and jurisdictions that make up each metropolitan statistical area.80 
This ranking provides the best baseline for the concerns of this article, specifically 
in defining what constitutes a mid-size metropolitan region. 
While population numbers are central to this article’s consideration of mid-
size metropolitan regions, population alone is insufficient to understand the 
differences between mid-size and large metropolitan regions. Density is one of the 
key metrics for understanding the spatial relationships of cities and metropolitan 
regions.81 For the majority of mid-size central cities, densities have never been 
high, and their overall development is characterized by low-density spatial forms 
that are relatively constant across traditional downtown areas and suburban areas 
alike. The land use and transportation patterns of mid-size metropolitan regions 
generally follow low-density, decentralized, automobile-oriented land use 
patterns.82 
                                                                                                                                      
 
representing the top eight percent in number and the top fifty-two percent in population of the 366 
MSAs. MSAs ranked numbers 30 to 102 fit this definition of mid-size, comprising twenty-six percent of 
the population of the 366 MSAs. The Las Vegas, Nevada, MSA ranks 30th with a population of 
1,951,269. The Durham-Chapel Hill, North Carolina, MSA ranks 102nd with a population of 504,357. 
This author appreciates that a mid-size metropolitan region classification based solely on a 
region’s population may overstate the role that population size plays in determining the economic 
competitiveness of a given metropolitan region. For instance, both New Orleans, Louisiana, and Las 
Vegas, Nevada, fall within this author’s definition of mid-size metropolitan regions. These areas 
arguably possess many of the same legacy credentials that larger population centers do, specifically in 
terms of brand capital and external recognition. While the classification used herein presents a higher 
floor and ceiling for the definition of “mid-size metropolitan region” than has been used in other studies, 
the emergence of global cities and the regional considerations at the core of the arguments presented 
herein require a definition of “mid-size metropolitan region” that reflects global realities, specifically 
with regards to the rise of global cities and global inter-urban competition. 
80 The United States Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines a Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(MSA) as a Core Based Statistical Area having at least one urbanized area of 50,000 or more 
population, plus adjacent territory that has a high degree of social and economic integration with the 
core as measured by commuting ties. The OMB has defined 366 MSAs for the United States as of 
March 29, 2010. See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 79. 
81 See FULTON ET AL., supra note 1, at 3–4. 
82 Because of the dearth of substantive research focused on mid-size metropolitan areas, this author 
relies on personal observations. For a discussion of the relationship between density, land use, and the 
automobile, see generally Edward H. Ziegler, Urban Sprawl, Growth Management and Sustainable 
Development in the United States: Thoughts on the Sentimental Quest for a New Middle Landscape, 11 
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 26 (2003); Filion & Bunting, supra note 69. 
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The mid-size region is defined by the relative pervasiveness of the low-
density form.83 Mid-size regions are likely at a disadvantage to their larger, denser 
counterparts because they lack the dense urban form dynamics that are endemic to 
places high in economic development activity. These more dense urban forms and 
land use patterns can achieve greater economies of scale by reducing the per capita 
costs of service delivery and infrastructure development.84 
Most mid-size regions developed in the twentieth century. Early in the 
twentieth century, several developments emerged that would shape land use, 
zoning, and the politics of boundary formation and reformation for the entirety of 
the twentieth century. Two of the most significant developments were the 
emergence of the automobile and intense race and class strife.85 These dynamics 
produced specific land use patterns that shaped mid-size regions differently than 
older, larger regions. The resulting land use dynamics are characterized by multiple 
dispersed activity nodes across a relatively low-density built environment. This has, 
in some cases, produced irregular land uses and correspondingly irregular land 
values. These dynamics complicate the physical proximity necessary for the type of 
market exchanges that drive economic development in urban centers.86 
One key distinction of the mid-size region is the relative lack of activity in the 
central city core.87 As a result of the relative lack of economic, social, and cultural 
activity occurring in their downtowns, mid-size regions rarely have well-developed 
inner-city land use and transportation dynamics that allow for high-density housing 
and commercial development arrangements on a meaningful scale.88 Downtown 
stabilization and revitalization largely depends on the presence of an effective and 
                                                           
 
83 See, e.g., Bunting et al., supra note 69, at 29–30. 
84 See, e.g., Jan K. Brueckner, Urban Sprawl: Diagnosis and Remedies, 23 INT’L REGIONAL SCI. REV. 
160, 166–67 (2000) (discussing market failure in the context of urban sprawl through the failure to fully 
account for the infrastructure costs of new development). 
85 See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (invalidating an Alabama law redefining the 
municipal limits of Tuskegee upon a finding that the boundary redefinition was motivated by a desire to 
disenfranchise black citizens); Cashin, supra note 2, at 1993 (“By delegating nearly complete authority 
to control land use to the lowest incorporated governmental units, state governments have created a 
social, fiscal, and political environment in which suburban jurisdictions are rationally motivated to use 
highly exclusionary zoning and developmental policies, and homogeneous localities can give effect to 
their worst biases.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
86 See Filion & Bunting, supra note 69, at 90–91. 
87 See Bunting et al., supra note 69, at 41–42. 
88 See id. at 41–46. 
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heavily used transit system, a major employment cluster, a dense inner city, and 
tourist appeal—traits usually lacking in mid-size regions.89 
Land use and transportation networks characterized by core area depletion 
and expansive suburban sprawl impact the economic development profile of mid-
size regions in a manner markedly different than larger, older, denser, and more 
diverse population centers.90 Consequently, mid-size metropolitan regions 
complicate prevailing notions of what constitutes the urban and the suburban. 
Prevailing stereotypes of urban and suburban development most commonly 
associated with large regions are insufficient when applied to mid-size metropolitan 
development patterns and land uses. Mid-size regions are typically less dense 
throughout their regions, while large urban regions typically have dense central 
cities and less dense suburban communities. Therefore, mid-size regions do not 
easily fit into the traditional city/suburb framework that is the focus of most 
metropolitan governance studies.91 
For many mid-size regions, particularly those in the Sun Belt region, the 
majority of the infrastructure development and land use decisions were made after 
the advent of the automobile and interstate system.92 When President Dwight 
Eisenhower signed the Federal Highway Act of 1956,93 which authorized the 
funding of the interstate highway system and consequently accelerated the 
development of suburban communities on the periphery of the nation’s major 
cities, mid-size cities like Memphis, Tennessee, and Raleigh, North Carolina, were 
considerably smaller than they are today.94 Their development patterns and spatial 
                                                           
 
89 See Filion & Bunting, supra note 69. 
90 See Bunting et al., supra note 69, at 46–47. 
91 U.S. cities overall do not rank high in population density when considered among the ranks of 
emerging global cities. Los Angeles, California (the city proper, as opposed to the metropolitan region) 
is the country’s most dense city with a 2007 population of 11,789,000 over 2684 square miles, or 4392 
people per square mile. This is unremarkable when compared to the world’s most dense city, Mumbai, 
India, which has 47,833 people per square mile. New York, on the other hand, is less dense than Los 
Angeles with 3299 people per square mile. In comparison to Los Angeles, U.S. cities located in mid-size 
metropolitan regions—regions between two million and one half million in population—have density 
numbers that range from the unusually high 3173 people per square mile in New Orleans, Louisiana to 
the more common 769 people per square mile in Knoxville, Tennessee. The Largest Cities in the World 
by Population Density, CITY MAYORS (Jan. 6, 2007), www.citymayors.com/statistics/largest-cities-
density-125.html (statistics used in this work reflect a conversion from kilometers to miles). 
92 See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 29. 
93 Pub. L. No. 84–627, 70 Stat. 374. 
94 See World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision, U.N. DEPARTMENT ECON. AND SOC. AFF., 
http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Documentation/publications.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2012). 
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arrangements therefore mirrored a more suburban form, even in the core of their 
central cities. 
Because mid-size regions are generally less dense than larger regions, their 
residents’ motivations for moving within the region may differ from those of larger 
regions. For instance, in large metropolitan regions, the urban core usually contains 
dense development patterns that include multi-family complexes, row house 
developments, and other small-lot, single-family dwellings. These land-use 
arrangements do not allow for an abundance of private land and, consequently, 
outdoor recreational activities are usually relegated to public parks and other public 
spaces. 
Given the pervasiveness of low-density development patterns in mid-size 
central cities, it is possible that movement within mid-size regions is spurred less 
by a desire for more space and more by a desire to associate or disassociate with 
groups depending upon one’s social position. This desire is often reflected in the 
local politics of race, class, and public schools—a discourse especially relevant for 
understanding social divisions in mid-size regions.95 A determined cohort of 
residents moving to peripheral areas adjacent to the municipal and school district 
boundaries could eventually develop the critical mass necessary to support their 
own autonomous entities.96 When these settlements form, they often are amenable 
to higher property taxes to support their own school district and government 
structures, indicating that their objection to being in the central city boundaries may 
not be higher taxes, but rather the redistribution of their tax dollars to support 
infrastructure and services for disfavored groups.97 
Mid-size regions and large regions share the effects of metropolitanization on 
their land use patterns. Metropolitanization is the process by which a central city 
evolves to become a component of a larger regional entity that includes outside 
environs—suburbs, exurbs, and surrounding rural areas—that are tied to the central 
city by employment, commerce, mass communications, economic interdependence, 
and cultural and identity ties.98 Metropolitanization in the United States is largely 
the result of early twentieth-century social and political alignments and related 
                                                           
 
95 See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, Forbidden Conversations: On Race, Privacy, and Community (A 
Continuing Conversation with John Ely on Racism and Democracy), 114 YALE L.J. 1353 (2005). 
96 See Cashin, supra note 2, at 1992–96. 
97 See id. 
98 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1116–17 (1996). 
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economic developments that resulted in the geographic expansion of social, 
economic, and cultural life from the central city core. 
As a consequence of metropolitanization, people no longer live their daily 
lives wholly in individual cities and towns or in singular municipal units. Eight-
four percent of Americans now live in a metropolitan region.99 Fifty-eight percent 
of the workers in metropolitan regions commute to jobs in a city or town different 
from the one in which they live but still within their metropolitan region.100 
Seventy-nine percent of metropolitan region residents who move choose another 
location in the same metropolitan region. Residents of metropolitan regions may 
live within separate geographic and political sub-units of the broader metropolitan 
region yet shop in different parts of metropolitan regions, receive “local” media 
from metro-wide newspapers and television stations, and root for sports teams and 
visit cultural institutions that represent and service an entire metropolitan region. 
Metropolitan regions represent the critical geographic lens through which it is 
possible to define and critique contemporary American society.101 They provide a 
window into the impact of geoeconomic realignments that have focused economic 
matters away from nation-states and towards metropolitan regions or, as they have 
been termed by some scholars, “citistates.”102 For at least the past two decades, 
urban research scholars have understood that American central cities are not only 
competing with their suburbs but also with metropolitan regional economies all 
over the globe.103 
Metropolitan regions are the dominant political and economic units through 
which the capital attraction motives of local governments are expressed. They are 
commonly identified by their central city anchors. For instance, the Los Angeles-
Long Beach-Santa Ana, California, MSA is commonly known as Los Angeles.104 
                                                           
 
99 BROOKINGS INST. METRO. POLICY PROGRAM, THE STATE OF METROPOLITAN AMERICA: ON THE 
FRONT LINES OF DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSFORMATION 16 (2010). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 See generally PEIRCE, supra note 72. 
103 See, e.g., Kingsley E. Haynes & Roger R. Stough, The Federal Urban Policy Agenda: Recent Past 
and New Realities, 551 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 73 (1997); Michael Stegman & Margery 
Austin Turner, The Future of Urban America in a Global Economy, 62 J. AM. PLANNING ASS’N, Spring 
1996, at 157. 
104 See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 79; U.S. Census Bureau, Metropolitan and 
Micropolitan Statistical Areas and Components (2010), http://www.census.gov/population/metro 
(exhibiting that metropolitan areas are generally named based upon the largest municipality included in 
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Employment growth is essential to metropolitan economic well-being; therefore, 
capital attraction is increasingly the primary focus of metropolitan economic 
development efforts.105 The central city of a metropolitan region—the largest or 
most commonly identified city in the region—must be healthy, vibrant, and ripe for 
economic possibility if the region is to prosper. Many of those central cities—
particularly those anchoring mid-size regions—have spent the past many decades 
contending with ever-increasing patterns of out-migration and suburbanization that 
have sucked people, firms, livelihoods, and tax revenue out of central cities and 
displaced them throughout the region. 
The mid-size region traditionally has offered few options for meaningful out-
migration to developed areas not yet under the control of the central city 
government. Given the relatively thin economic base and historically low growth 
rates of many of these communities, suburban growth is often slow and sparse, 
with many areas retaining rural characteristics as they slowly develop a suburban 
identity.106 The lack of worthwhile escape options colors the approach to managing 
social hierarchy. These dynamics impact the social construction of place and a 
community’s determinations of what constitutes favored and disfavored identity 
within the metropolitan region. 
Notions of favored and disfavored identity—as typically expressed in race 
and class struggles—are inextricably connected to commonly held beliefs about the 
bundle of rights associated with private property as well as the social construction 
of municipal boundaries.107 They are deeply intertwined with current trends in 
urban redevelopment and its over-focus on the gentrification of urban space to 
create amenities and privatized spaces for the affluent.108 These trends often result 
                                                                                                                                      
 
the metropolitan area). For an explanation of the standards used to determine how metropolitan and 
micropolitan statistical areas are defined, see 2010 Standards for Delineating Metropolitan and 
Micropolitan Statistical Areas, 75 Fed. Reg. 37,246 (June 28, 2010). 
105 See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, Reassessing the State and Local Government Toolkit: Rethinking the 
Theory and Practice of Local Economic Development, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 338–39 (2010). 
106 See Filion & Bunting, supra note 69, at 87–114. 
107 See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1713–14 (1993) 
(discussing whiteness as treasured property in a society structured on racial caste and how, over time, 
the benefits and expectations associated with the privileges of whiteness have been affirmed, legitimated 
and protected by the law); Anderson, supra note 16, at 940 (discussing the racial segregation function of 
municipal boundaries); Rolf Pendall, Local Land Use Regulation and the Chain of Exclusion, 66 J. AM. 
PLANNING ASS’N 125, 126–27 (2000) (discussing exclusionary land use controls and how municipal 
governments have fostered racial discrimination and exclusion through zoning). 
108 See McFarlane, supra note 46, at 113–18 (discussing the prioritization of the consumption needs of 
the affluent and the promotion of land uses, amenities, and aesthetics in contemporary urban 
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in the subordination of disfavored identity groups that are not only socially 
marginalized in these processes, but for whom insufficient options are made 
available through urban redevelopment’s remaking of urban spaces. This, in turn, 
reduces their presence in urban spaces.109 
The relative paucity of options in a low-density, yet territorially compact, 
environment for favored groups to meaningfully spatially separate from disfavored 
groups intensifies the nature of the social stratification existing therein. 
Consequently, in mid-size regions, resettlement on the periphery of the central city 
boundaries may reflect a more conscious and deliberate rejection of the central 
city’s demographics than may be the case in larger regions.110 
The role these sociological factors play in the making and remaking of 
municipal boundaries is exacerbated by the ascendance of a general culture of mass 
affluence. The sociopolitical implications of late trends in consumerism heighten 
the focus on real class status as measured by perceived consumer segment 
performance.111 This reinforces notions of favored and disfavored identity, 
consequently defining notions of who belongs in communities in part by municipal 
boundaries. The relatively constrained local economy and territorially compact 
nature of mid-size regions magnifies the dynamics of this race and class 
stratification, resulting in more acute social divisions than may exist in a large 
metropolitan region.112 Furthermore, many of these regions are within states that 
are home to sedentary family structures, meaning that an overwhelming majority of 
                                                                                                                                      
 
redevelopment ventures that appeal to the sensibilities and tastes of the affluent at the expense of more 
inclusive and equitable methods of land use). 
109 See id. 
110 Large metropolitan central cities often see the very wealthy and the very poor living within the 
central city while the middle class—who both cannot afford the central city’s wealthier areas and who 
are fleeing any proximity to the central city’s poorer areas—are relegated to the urban fringe. 
111 For a more in-depth discussion on the relationship between global consumer identity formation, mass 
affluence, and urban real estate development trends, see generally McFarlane, supra note 46, at 124–28 
(2009) (discussing clustering, geo-demographic profiling, and other methods of advanced marketing and 
consumer segmentation that produce new forms of social and economic exclusion masked as identity-
neutral responses to observable, quantifiable market behavior). 
112 While the author remains unaware of any available studies exploring this phenomenon, this author 
draws on personal observations of the intensified race and class divisions existing in mid-size urban 
settings as compared to large urban settings. In large urban settings, race and class groups have the 
space to develop sizeable, self-contained and racially homogenous neighborhoods that preclude the need 
to co-mingle with other groups. In the mid-size setting, however, this author’s personal observations 
reveal that the relative lack of meaningful spatial separation necessitates the development of social 
norms that enforce a race- or class-based social order. 
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the residents are from the state.113 The higher sedentary family structure rate likely 
reflects relatively low levels of in-migration, which may reflect a lack of 
competitive and quality employment prospects to lure new residents in. It also adds 
an inter-generational character to the social patterns that, over time, magnify the 
stigmas tied to place. 
Many mid-size regions’ central cities are facing declining populations and 
constricting tax bases amidst rapidly complexifying geoeconomic competitive 
forces.114 They risk ending up with relatively less dynamic regional economies, 
which makes attracting and retaining new investments more difficult and the 
consequences of failing to do so all the more dire. Because of these and other 
realities, mid-size regions are considerably more exposed to the underside of global 
inter-urban competition for mobile capital. The expansion of central city 
boundaries is one of the most efficient methods for achieving the regional 
municipal consolidation needed to spur overall regional growth and economic 
competitiveness in mid-size regions.115 
B. The Mid-Size Metropolis, Economic Development and 
Mobile Capital 
For many mid-size central cities, property value appreciation and population 
growth occur away from the central city or regional core, intensifying 
fragmentation patterns.116 These mid-size central cities are disproportionately home 
to their region’s neediest residents—those left behind by cycles of out-migration. 
Consequently, they face the challenge of providing infrastructure and leading 
regional economic development efforts while burdened by a declining tax base and 
an increasingly fragmented system of metropolitan governance. While 
fragmentation may not be determinative of economic competitiveness in every 
                                                           
 
113 Louisiana, for instance, is said to have the most sedentary family structure in the nation, with 79% of 
its current residents having been born in Louisiana. See Blaine Harden & Shankar Vedantam, Many 
Displaced by Katrina Turn to Relatives for Shelter, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2005, at A01. 
114 See Bunting et al., supra note 69. 
115 While this article focuses on annexation as a tool for facilitating regional governance, there exist 
other examples—although few—of relatively successful regional governments. Minnesota’s Twin Cities 
region is frequently lauded as a model of regional governance. Since 1994, the Metropolitan Council of 
the Twin Cities has exercised jurisdiction over all sewer, transit, and land use planning for the seven 
counties and 188 cities within the Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota, metropolitan region. See, e.g., 
MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS 13 (1997). 
116 See Bunting et al., supra note 69, at 46 (explaining that, due to the supply of relatively cheap land 
and the pervasiveness of the automobile, most employment nodes in mid-size regions are found well 
outside of the core, dictating settlement and development trends). 
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case, it can thwart the efficient development of a regional economic development 
program that reflects the global intra-urban competitive landscape.117 Ultimately, 
the combined force of these factors complicates regional economic development 
capacity at a time of increasing global inter-urban competition. 
Various studies support the contention that fragmentation is bad for 
metropolitan economic development efforts. For instance, a higher number of 
counties in a metropolitan region can have a negative effect on infrastructure 
expenditures.118 Rusk’s Annexation and the Fiscal Fate of Cities formulates a 
statistical link between fiscal health and inelastic cities—cities that are, or have in 
the past been, unable to expand their boundaries over time.119 The report’s findings 
support the contention that a city’s ability to annex land from its surrounding 
county is one of the primary determinants of its fiscal health and that cities with 
greater capacity to annex have much higher bond ratings.120 
Boundary elasticity determines how well a city succeeds in maintaining its 
market share of sprawling growth—a dominant factor in determining municipal 
bond ratings. Rusk’s findings showed that inelastic cities are highly dependent on 
state bailouts and outside financing for major regional investments. Such inelastic 
cities are concentrated in the Northeastern and Midwestern states. Cities located in 
states with annexation regimes that allow for high levels of boundary elasticity are 
fiscally healthier and arguably more competitively positioned for economic 
development success.121 
Countering Rusk’s position is a long line of urban studies local government 
law scholarship extolling the benefits of municipal fragmentation.122 They reflect 
                                                           
 
117 See Carruthers & Ulfarsson, supra note 1, at 316–20. 
118 See, e.g., Markus Berensson, Government Fragmentation is Holding Back America’s Metropolitan 
Regions, CITY MAYORS (May 3, 2011, 11:25 AM), http://www.citymayors.com/government/us-
government-fragmentation.html; see also Markus Berensson, Metropolitan Fragmentation and 
Economic Growth (Jan. 2011) (unpublished thesis) (on file with author). 
119 See RUSK, supra note 15, at 2, 6. But see Edwards, supra note 14, at 133 (citing studies that call into 
question the empirical evidence supporting Rusk’s prescriptions for central city decline, including 
enhanced annexation powers); Mary M. Edwards & Yu Xiao, Annexation, Local Government Spending, 
and the Complicating Role of Density, 45 URB. AFF. REV. 147, 162–64 (2009) (finding that the net fiscal 
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population density, holding socioeconomic and geographic variables constant). 
120 See RUSK, supra note 15, at 6. 
121 See id. at 7. 
122 See generally Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) 
(arguing that metropolitan residents are essentially “consumer voters,” and that the greater the number 
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the ideology of what local government law scholar Richard Briffault has termed 
“localism”: the ability of unincorporated areas to determine whether or not they 
desire to be annexed purely according to localist considerations and without any 
consideration of or regard for the metropolitan region as a whole.123 
Proponents of intra-regional competition and local government fragmentation 
underestimate ever-evolving geoeconomic realities. Their logic, if continued, will 
ultimately hamstring the ability of mid-size regions to remain competitive. The 
efficiency and sociological arguments in favor of greater annexation powers for 
central cities are compelling and paint an empirically grounded cautionary tale for 
mid-size regions.124 Mid-size central cities have to shift their scope of competition 
away from localities within their regions and towards other metropolitan regions. 
After almost a century of the suburban sprawl, race and class stratification, 
environmentally harmful automobile dependence, and intra-regional local 
government competition that localism has produced, arguments in favor of 
fragmentation appear woefully short-sighted. While they contribute to a worthwhile 
debate about the impact of fragmentation on the economic competitiveness of a 
region, they pale in relevance to new insights about more sustainable regional 
governance structures. More innovative approaches characterized as “new 
regionalist” advocate for more centralized decision-making in an effort to limit 
regional inequities.125 
Just as metropolitanization has redefined the meaning of urban and municipal 
identity, there have been concurrent shifts in the nature of economic development 
and metropolitan economic growth. The globalization narrative is now widely 
recognized and understood in its capacity for characterizing an array of dynamics 
that have become normalized in discussions about economics, culture, law, and 
                                                                                                                                      
 
of communities the consumer voter has to choose from and the greater the variance between them, the 
closer the consumer will come to realizing his preference position, leading more local governments into 
intra-urban competition to provide the most competitive mix of taxes and services); Gillette, supra note 
16 (arguing that the expansion of jurisdictional boundaries through annexation and regionalization 
threatens the benefits of decentralization, impairs the ability of smaller jurisdictions to promote political 
participation, and reduces the competition among localities to control bureaucratic budgets and facilitate 
monitoring of local officials). 
123 See Briffault, supra note 2, at 77–81. 
124 See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, Suburbs as Exit, Suburbs as Entrance, 106 MICH. L. REV. 277, 296–
98 (2007) (discussing the negative externalities, transactional costs and related efficiency-based 
arguments against fragmentation). 
125 See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, Unsubsidizing Suburbia: The Urban Origins of Suburban Autonomy, 
90 MINN. L. REV. 459, 484–86 (2005) (book review). 
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society.126 The globalization of commerce, the financialization of the global 
economy, and the rise of multi-national corporations have spurred development and 
investment activities unrestricted by national borders or abstract notions of 
locational identity.127 This has spurred a growing attention to regional economies 
and policies. The processes of globalization express themselves in social and 
economic conditions of specific geographic regions, reshaping economies and 
urban spaces alike.128 
Companies are increasingly brokering with local governments to secure the 
best deals for corporate headquarters and industrial plant locations, real estate 
development projects, and other investments.129 Capital mobility encompasses an 
ever-complexifying web of multi-national corporations, placeless enterprises, and 
the whimsical and self-serving economic values of a global elite whose 
                                                           
 
126 See, e.g., THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT (2005); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION 
AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); David S. Law, Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights, 
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127 See, e.g., Yishai Blank, Federalism, Solidarity, and the Role of Local Governments in an Age of 
Global Multilevel Governance, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509, 513–16 (2010) (discussing the processes 
and characteristics of globalization and its subjective identification and social configuration). 
128 All are not convinced that globalization is an ominous harbinger of the economic fate of metropolitan 
regions. Some scholars have critiqued the mobility of capital narrative and exposed the manner in which 
it is, in many ways, a social construction deployed to justify local actions that often threaten the status of 
vulnerable communities. Specifically, the globalization trope has been presented as one that unleashes 
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appreciates the constructedness of the globalization trope and its potential to legitimize policies and 
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it cannot be overlooked that the increasing mobility of capital is simultaneously a social construction 
and an observable, quantifiable fact. On the one hand, there is a socially constructed narrative of mobile 
capital that serves the interests of capital in creating anxiety in the political class and the justification for 
public subsidies for business. On the other hand, capital is, in actuality, much less bounded by 
geographic borders or local allegiances than ever before. In responding to the legitimate critique that the 
globalization trope—or the mobile capital trope, in the context of this author’s presentation—is often 
served up to prop up business interests, here the issue is presented to bolster the position of the 
metropolitan regional governments that inevitably have to contend with this phenomenon. See generally 
DAVID A. WILSON, CITIES AND RACE: AMERICA’S NEW BLACK GHETTO 49–69 (2007); see also Neil 
Smith, New Globalism, New Urbanism, in SPACES OF NEOLIBERALISM: URBAN RESTRUCTURING IN 
NORTH AMERICAN AND EUROPE 86–87 (Neil Brenner & Nik Theodore eds., 2002) (discussing the 
increasing territorialization of production centering in extended metropolitan centers rather than larger 
geographic regions). 
129 See Richard C. Schragger, Cities, Economic Development, and the Free Trade Constitution, 94 VA. 
L. REV. 1091 (2008). 
A N N E X A T I O N  A N D  T H E  M I D - S I Z E  M E T R O P O L I S   
 
P A G E  |  5 3 5   
 
manipulation of technology allows them to surf the globe in search of new markets 
to exploit. These entities are constantly rent-seeking for the best locational value.130 
The problem of mobile capital is the problem of capital mobility and, 
ultimately, capital flight.131 Capital is not always a rational actor and may remain 
tied to a region because of history, relationships, or other non-economic factors. As 
technology and financialization in global markets become ever more sophisticated, 
however, firms will be less and less tied to any one geographic place.132 
Local governments are inherently immobile, place-based enterprises that seek 
to leverage their natural and developed capital to improve their quality of life. 
Local government competition has traditionally been conceived of in inter-
municipal, intra-regional terms that strive to resolve the relative strengths and 
weaknesses between different municipal governments within a particular region. 
Economist and scholar of local government Charles Tiebout is noted for his theory 
that increased fragmentation and intra-regional, inter-municipal competition is 
good for “consumer voters” who seek to maximize the government services they 
receive while minimizing the taxes they pay.133 He and others posit that municipal 
fragmentation is actually a preferable metropolitan local government organizing 
strategy, as it allows individuals and firms to choose the local government that best 
reflects their tastes and needs.134 
Other theorists have focused on the “city powerless” theme, arguing that cities 
are ultimately powerless because they cannot control either their political destiny, 
                                                           
 
130 It is important to note that not all capital is highly mobile or mobile at all. Businesses whose 
production or raw materials needs are geographically based, or which require a specifically skilled labor 
pool, are tied to place in a manner that flips the city-business power dynamic presented herein. 
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Robert Warren, The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry, 55 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 831 (1961). 
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due to their status as instrumentalities of the states, or their economic destiny, due 
to the nature of mobile capital.135 Unlike the mid-twentieth century geopolitical and 
geoeconomic realities, however, today’s conditions see governments in a particular 
region no longer able to look only inward to comprehend the challenges to growth 
going forward. They must acknowledge that global inter-urban competition for 
mobile capital renders the furtherance of intra-regional municipal fragmentation 
counterproductive in the new competitive paradigm.136 
The effect of capital attraction on metropolitan economic development 
approaches presents new challenges for prevailing notions of localism in 
metropolitan governance.137 The ability of metropolitan regions to collectively 
offer services and develop stable tax bases is inextricably related to how they fare 
in the global competition for new economic development opportunities.138 
Municipal fragmentation is cumbersome for navigating today’s geopolitical and 
geoeconomic realities and essentially pits localities, regions, and states against each 
other. 
For instance, cities like Kansas City, Kansas, and Kansas City, Missouri, exist 
in the same metropolitan region.139 Over the past few years the two cities have been 
engaged in what many have called a “border war,” with each state courting the 
other’s businesses with relocation tax incentive packages.140 Of the fifty-three 
companies that have received state tax incentives to move into Kansas since the 
2009 fiscal year, forty-five have been from Missouri.141 
                                                           
 
135 See, e.g., PAUL PETERSON, CITY LIMITS (1981); Gerald Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. 
L. REV. 1057 (1980); Briffault, supra note 2; Briffault, supra note 8, at 355–56. 
136 See Schragger, supra note 8, at 483 (discussing how urban politics must invariably be in favor of 
mobile capital, and that more robust economic regulation must take place at a higher level of 
government). 
137 See Schragger, supra note 129; see also Frug, supra note 56, at 1761. 
138 See, e.g., Steven S. Kaufman, Regional Economies and the Constitutional Imperative of Economic 
Domain, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1199, 1205–07 (2008) (discussing the need for regional 
governmental reform to address economic development realities). 
139 The Kansas City, MO-KS Metropolitan Statistical Area is recognized by the United States Office of 
Management and Budget and, as of April 1, 2010, ranked twenty-ninth among the top 366 top 
metropolitan regions. See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 79. 
140 See A.G. Sulzberger, In War Between States for Jobs, Businesses Stand to Gain Most, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 8, 2011, at A1. 
141 Id. 
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Similarly, South Dakota has for a long time run print and radio 
advertisements in Minnesota to recruit neighboring businesses.142 The specter of 
these interstate competitions reflects a disconnect between global developments in 
the inter-urban competition for mobile capital and the manner in which policy 
makers on the ground perceive both their role and the explanations for their 
threatened or stifled economic development fortunes. Both local governments and 
corporations are responding to these new realities in a manner that calls for a re-
examination of long held notions of intra-regional local government relations and 
the purported virtues of having many separate and autonomous local governments 
within a metropolitan region.143 Municipalities within a metropolitan region can 
minimize fragmentation by capitalizing on the efficiencies of more centralized 
metropolitan systems of governance.144 
Like metropolitanization, there is a race and class dimension to the rise of 
these new geoeconomic forces. The manner in which geoeconomic forces and 
economic development pressures affect local government resource allocation is 
evidence of the globalization of urbanism.145 In the United States, the past three 
decades have seen an increase in social stratification, impacting historically 
marginalized populations and emerging disfavored identity groups. These 
developments have been well documented and discussed in sociological and 
geographic analyses of urban life in the past many years146 and have occurred 
                                                           
 
142 Id. 
143 While competition for capital is widely accepted as a catalyst for shifting government priorities away 
from non-productive public spending and toward business-friendly investments, the underlying benefit 
and ultimate effect on government behavior is unclear. Some scholars view such competition as an 
incentive for better government, while others contend that competition leads to a race to the bottom and 
negative consequences for the competing localities. See Hongbin Cai & Daniel Treisman, Does 
Competition for Capital Discipline Governments? Decentralization, Globalization and Public Policy, 
95 AM. ECON. REV. 817, 828 (2005); see also Daniel Treisman, Decentralization and the Quality of 
Government (Nov. 20, 2000) (unpublished manuscript), 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2000/fiscal/treisman.pdf. 
144 See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 138 (calling for intra-regional partnerships, although not specifically 
listing annexation as a tool for developing those partnerships). 
145 The term “globalization of urbanism” has been used in a number of contexts, but always to describe 
the impact of globalism on the urban form, urban governance and urban culture. See, e.g., GLOBAL 
CITIES: CINEMA, ARCHITECTURE AND URBANISM IN A DIGITAL AGE (Linda Krause & Patrice Petro eds., 
2003). 
146 See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 48; WILSON, supra note 48; WILSON, supra note 128. 
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concurrently with a rising anti-government backlash tied to post-Great Society and 
Civil Rights Era political conservatism.147 
Urban geographer Neil Smith has used the term “revanchist city” to 
characterize the modern city’s embrace of authoritarian forms of social control and 
considerable subsidies to corporate interests.148 Essentially, the globalization of 
urbanism is reflected in the manner that capital attraction motives have influenced 
local urban policy. These trends are linked to the rise of urban development 
regimes overly focused on affluent development and modified measures that 
facilitate segregation by economic class, real or perceived aspirational identity, and 
favored or disfavored identity status. In the context of these social and economic 
processes, annexation can serve as either a tool to facilitate the affluent 
suburbanite’s separation or as a tool to facilitate the municipality’s maintenance of 
redistributive economies and governance.149 
                                                           
 
147 See, e.g., ALICE O’CONNOR, POVERTY KNOWLEDGE: SOCIAL SCIENCE, SOCIAL POLICY AND THE 
POOR IN TWENTIETH CENTURY U.S. HISTORY 246–59 (2001) (discussing both the development of neo-
conservative rhetoric and neoliberalism that formed the new “welfare consensus” constructed around 
notions of the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor and the role of government in addressing their needs, 
specifically resulting in the dramatic decrease in social services and social welfare spending, particularly 
in monies dedicated for urban renewal, during the rise of modern conservatism in the Reagan era). 
148 See generally NEIL SMITH, THE NEW URBAN FRONTIER: GENTRIFICATION AND THE REVANCHIST 
CITY (1996). Revanchists (from the French word “revanche,” meaning “revenge”) were a group of 
Parisian bourgeois nationalist reactionaries who opposed the rise of liberalism when the working classes 
took over from the defeated government of Napoleon III and controlled the city for months. The 
revanchists were determined to reinstate the bourgeois order using a strategy that fused militarism and 
moralism with claims about restoring public order on the streets. Neil Smith identifies the similarities 
between the revanchism of late-nineteenth century Paris and the political climate of late-twentieth 
century New York City that emerged to fill the vacuum left by the disintegration of liberal urban policy. 
The notion of “the revanchist city” captures the disturbing urban condition created by a political shift 
from the redistributive liberal policy of the post-1960 era leading up to the 1980s and the revanchism 
that took hold afterwards. Whereas the liberal period was characterized by redistributive policy, 
affirmative action and antipoverty legislation, the era of neoliberal revanchism was characterized by a 
discourse of revenge against minorities, the working class, feminists, environmental activists, gays and 
lesbians, and recent immigrants: the “public enemies” of the bourgeois political elite and their 
supporters. New York City in the 1990s became an arena for concerted attacks on affirmative action and 
immigration policy, street violence against gays and homeless people, feminist-bashing, and public 
campaigns against political correctness and multiculturalism. Just as the bourgeois order was perceived 
as under threat by the revanchists of 1890s Paris, in 1990s New York, a particular, exclusionary vision 
of “civil society” was being reinstated with a vengeance—an attempt to banish those not part of that 
vision to the urban periphery. Smith expanded his revanchism theory to something common to the 
restructured urban geography of the late capitalist city. 
149 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 16, at 944–59. 
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The urban/suburban frame fails to comprehend and adequately characterize 
metropolitanization in mid-size regions, and its value diminishes even further in the 
face of emerging trends in urban redevelopment, new urbanism,150 gentrification, 
and the banishment of the urban poor and working poor. These economic 
realignments influence land use and development patterns to focus on spaces that 
fit the commodified, mass-marketed, idealized aesthetic of mixed-use (and seldom 
mixed-income), master-planned community living and those spaces that do not.151 
These developments have transformed the contemporary landscape of urban 
development into what has been called “a highly commodified arena of urban place 
production.”152 
The most typical way of intensifying land use is growth, which usually 
expresses itself in a constantly rising population. Cities promote their “good 
business climate” attributes, which include low business taxes, a good 
infrastructure of municipal services, vigorous law enforcement, an eager and docile 
labor force, and a minimum of business regulations. An expanded work force and 
its attendant purchasing power, in turn, lead to an expansion of retail and other 
commercial activity, extensive land and housing development, and increased 
financial activity. This chain of events and its consequences renders the city a 
“growth machine,” and those who dominate it, members of a “growth coalition.”153 
                                                           
 
150 New Urbanism is the more than twenty-year-old architectural and urban-planning movement that 
advocates and promotes the development of mixed-use (and, in some cases mixed-income, but not 
necessarily), walkable neighborhoods and developments that minimize automobile dependence and 
wasteful land use while maximizing density, master planning, and compactness. New Urbanism has also 
led the development of smart codes, which codify new urbanism principles and approaches into 
implementable zoning and land-use policies. Smart codes are developed in a manner that is easily 
adaptable for municipal governments. For a further discussion of new urbanism, see generally Michael 
Lewyn, New Urbanist Zoning for Dummies, 58 ALA. L. REV. 257 (2006). 
151 See Briffault, supra note 8, at 383–90 (discussing legal and policy developments supporting 
exclusionary zoning in suburban communities). 
152 THE URBAN GROWTH MACHINE: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES TWO DECADES LATER 6 (Andrew E.G. 
Jonas & David Wilson eds., 1999) [hereinafter THE URBAN GROWTH MACHINE]. 
153 The “growth machine” thesis argues that central to urban politics is land and its political, economic, 
and social construction as place. The thesis focuses around coalitions of land-based elites, united around 
the commodification and related economic-centric construction of the possibilities of place, who drove 
urban politics in their quest to expand the local economy and accumulate wealth. “Growth coalition 
theory” posits that city governments are, in many ways, local power structures representing an aggregate 
of land-based interests that profit from the increasingly intensive use of land. Property owners see their 
futures as linked together because of a common desire to increase the value of their individual parcels. 
See, e.g., Scott Rogers & Milton Keynes, Urban Geography: Urban Growth Machine, in 12 INT’L 
ENCYCLOPEDIA HUM. GEOGRAPHY 40, 40–45 (Rob Kitchin & Nigel Thrift eds., 2009). See JOHN R. 
LOGAN & HARVEY. L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE (1987). See 
also THE URBAN GROWTH MACHINE, supra note 152. 
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While in many ways these dynamics have always been present in cities and are 
understandable given the structure of American capitalism, recent geoeconomic 
shifts have intensified their character, such that these dynamics now dominate local 
political economy.154 
The “growth machine” thesis reflects other critical perspectives on urban 
governance and political economy that essentially mobilize urban space for 
economic growth and to cater to the consumption practices and tastes of the 
affluent.155 Casting these developments as entirely negative is too simplistic of an 
analysis, for there are benefits and challenges presented by the new arrangements 
and institutional realignments that can be managed for egalitarian purposes. For 
this to occur, however, central cities must be able to expand their borders in a 
manner that allows them to exercise the economic development leadership 
necessary to succeed amidst the broader terrain of inter-urban competition for 
mobile capital.156 
Global capitalist growth and expansion—particularly for the firms that 
characterize mobile capital—is tied to geographic landscapes through a process that 
privileges some places, territories, and regions as sites for capital accumulation to 
the detriment of others.157 These geoeconomic shifts and transformations are 
altering the connections between transnational capital, social relations, and the 
meaning of “community,” “urban,” and “regional.”158 Restrictive annexation 
regimes can limit a city’s ability to grow, thereby making annexation policy a 
concern of great significance to mid-size metropolitan regions. 
                                                           
 
154 See Schragger, supra note 8, at 491–97 (discussing the history of boosterism, growth coalitions and 
the politics of capital attraction). 
155 See Neil Brenner & Nik Theodore, Cities and the Geographies of “Actually Existing Neoliberalism,” 
in SPACES OF NEOLIBERALISM: URBAN RESTRUCTURING IN NORTH AMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE 2, 
20–29 (Neil Brenner & Nik Theodore eds., 2002). 
156 Benefits include the establishment of cooperative, business-led networks in local politics; the 
mobilization of new forms of local economic development policy that foster inter-firm cooperation and 
industrial clustering; the development of community-based programs to alleviate social exclusion; the 
promotion of new forms of coordination and inter-organizational networking among previously distinct 
spheres of local and state intervention; and the creation of new regional institutions to promote 
metropolitan-wide place-marketing and intergovernmental coordination. See id. at 27. 
157 See id. at 2–32. 
158 See Smith, supra note 128, at 80–103. 
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PART III: ANNEXATION IN CONTEXT: APPROACHES AND 
SOLUTIONS 
A central city’s boundary expansion plans not only have to contend with the 
myriad of factors driving central city out-migration, but also its state’s annexation 
regime. Research shows that there is a relationship between a state’s annexation 
regime and the nature of annexation activity in the state.159 If taxes or race and 
class dynamics have driven high-tax residents to unincorporated areas on the 
central city’s periphery, the state’s annexation regime can aid the central city in 
recapturing that tax base; such recapture efforts are typically the impetus for 
contentious annexation battles. While these annexation battles occur frequently, 
Mississippi, Tennessee, and North Carolina provide compelling examples for how 
state annexation regimes can either help or hinder mid-size central cities. 
These states differ considerably in both the theory of annexation they embrace 
and the construction of their respective annexation regimes, but they are alike in 
that they are all Southern states whose largest metropolitan regions fall within this 
author’s definition of mid-size.160 Many of their regional central cities have been 
actively and frequently pursuing growth objectives that include or are dependent 
upon annexation.161 
Size matters for the mid-size central cities of these states. They have 
expanded through previous annexations and, in many cases, have tested their 
states’ annexation laws through prolonged, intense boundary disputes. While 
metropolitanization has forged strong regional identities, opposition to annexation 
persists. What mediates the impact of this annexation backlash is the relative 
sophistication of the state’s respective annexation regime. For Jackson, Mississippi, 
the state’s annexation policy has effectively stifled its expansion. Tennessee’s 
annexation regime includes a land use policy with meaningful protections of 
central cities. North Carolina’s annexation regime has arguably fueled the 
considerable economic development successes of metropolitan regions throughout 
the state. 
                                                           
 
159 See Edwards, supra note 14, at 125–27. 
160 The population numbers and rankings for the mid-size MSAs of the three states are: Charlotte, North 
Carolina (1.7 million; 33); Nashville, Tennessee (1.59 million; 38); Memphis, Tennessee (1.3 million; 
41); Raleigh, North Carolina (1.13 million; 48); Greensboro, North Carolina (723,801; 71); Knoxville, 
Tennessee (698,030; 75); Jackson, Mississippi (539,057; 96); Chattanooga, Tennessee (528,143; 97) and 
Durham, North Carolina (504,357; 102). See U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 79. 
161 See generally Rice, supra note 53. 
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A. Mississippi 
Disputes over the expansion of Mississippi’s largest city, Jackson, illustrate 
the challenges mid-size central cities face in resolving weak state annexation 
regimes with the need for boundary expansion. Jackson is the ninety-sixth largest 
metropolitan region in the nation and grew 8.42% between 2000 and 2010.162 It is 
the largest metropolitan region in the state of Mississippi and is the state capital. 
Jackson is characteristic of many mid-size regions. Its land use patterns are 
characterized by low to moderate-density development over a relatively territorially 
compact urbanized area with a patchwork of suburbs and rural development on the 
periphery. The urban form is dominated by the roadways and parking lots that 
facilitate automobile movement within and through the region. Race and class 
dynamics reflect high levels of stratification, while attractive options for white and 
middle-class flight outside of the central city largely consist of neighborhood-
centric residential development with supporting retail and commercial 
developments in a rural or light-suburban setting. 
The recently incorporated town of Byram, Mississippi, lies immediately on 
Jackson’s southern boundary.163 For more than ten years, Byram was embroiled in 
legal battles with Jackson regarding its annexation and incorporation.164 The first 
round occurred in the 1990s when Byram successfully defeated an attempted 
annexation of its area. The case of In re Enlargement and Extension of the 
Municipal Boundaries of Jackson (Byram I)165 arose out of Jackson’s attempted 
annexation of 24.25 square miles of unincorporated territory that included 
Byram.166 Pursuant to the state’s annexation policy, the Jackson City Council 
adopted an ordinance approving the annexation, the petition was filed in the 
Chancery Court, and final judgment was rendered in favor of the City of 
                                                           
 
162 State of Metropolitan America Indicator Map, BROOKINGS INST., www.brookings.edu/metro/ 
StateOfMetroAmerica/Map.aspx# (last visited Oct. 18, 2012). 
163 See Cheryl Lasseter, Byram Is Soon To Be an Incorporated City, WBLT (Apr. 3, 2009), 
http://www.wlbt.com/global/story.asp?s=10129297. 
164 See, e.g., Elizabeth Kirkland, Byram Community Seeking Incorporation Again, MISS. BUS. J., 
May 28, 2001, at 15. 
165 691 So. 2d 978 (Miss. 1997). 
166 See id. at 979. 
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Jackson.167 The action was approved by the lower court but ultimately overturned 
by the Mississippi Supreme Court.168 
Jackson’s ability to annex the Byram area was greatly limited by 
Mississippi’s annexation regime. Mississippi’s statutes relating to municipalities 
contain no policy statements on the role of annexation and incorporation in land-
use planning.169 Procedurally, Mississippi allows for a municipality seeking to 
annex unincorporated lands to initiate the matter in its governing body. If passed, 
the municipality must present the petition to the Chancery Court of its county.170 
The statute provides that the Chancery Court should ratify the petition if the 
annexation is reasonable and is required by public convenience and necessity.171 
Under Mississippi law the courts are charged with assessing the reasonableness of a 
municipality’s decision to annex unincorporated property.172 Mississippi courts 
have determined that annexation is reasonable only if it is fair and that, in making 
this determination, annexation must be viewed from the perspective of both the city 
and the landowners of the proposed annexation area.173 
Mississippi courts have established twelve indicia against which the 
reasonableness of a particular annexation proposal is judged.174 The courts consider 
                                                           
 
167 See id. 
168 See id. at 979–80. 
169 See MISS. CODE ANN. § 21-1-27 (2011). 
170 See id. § 21-1-29. 
171 See id. § 21-1-33 (“If the chancellor finds from the evidence presented at such hearing that the 
proposed enlargement or contraction is reasonable and is required by the public convenience and 
necessity and, in the event of an enlargement of a municipality, that reasonable public and municipal 
services will be rendered in the annexed territory within a reasonable time, the chancellor shall enter a 
decree approving, ratifying and confirming the proposed enlargement or contraction, and describing the 
boundaries of the municipality as altered.”). 
172 See City of Jackson v. Byram Incorporators, 16 So. 3d 662, 672 (Miss. 2009) (“The authority to 
initiate such [annexation] proceedings rests with the governing authorities of such municipality.”). 
173 See generally Byram I, 691 So. 2d 978. 
174 See, e.g., id. at 980 (citing In re Extension of the Boundaries of Jackson, 551 So. 2d 861, 864 (Miss. 
1989)). The twelve indicia of reasonableness are (1) the municipality’s need to expand; (2) whether the 
area sought to be annexed is reasonably within a path of growth of the city; (3) potential health hazards 
from sewage and waste disposal in the annexed areas; (4) the municipality’s financial ability to make the 
improvements and furnish municipal services promised; (5) need for zoning and overall planning in the 
areas; (6) need for municipal services in the areas sought to be annexed; (7) whether there are natural 
barriers between the city and the proposed annexation area; (8) past performance and time element 
involved in the city’s provision of services to its present residents; (9) economic or other impact of the 
annexation upon those who live in or own property in the proposed annexation area; (10) impact of the 
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these factors under a totality of the circumstances analysis that limits the ability of 
any one factor to be considered separately or independently of the others.175 In 
Byram I, Jackson framed its argument in regionalist terms by contending that the 
fate of the region was directly tied to the success of its central city, Jackson. It 
argued that a decline in its general welfare, quality of life, or economic 
development potential would have an adverse effect not only on Jackson but on the 
entire metropolitan region.176 Additionally, the city argued that it needed to expand 
its tax base to deal with declining real property values and stagnant municipal tax 
revenue.177 The lower court was sympathetic to this position, holding that as the 
economic, governmental, and cultural center of the state, Jackson’s continued 
economic well-being is important to the central portion of Mississippi and the 
entire state.178 The lower court’s conception of reasonableness incorporated an 
analysis of the economic development impact on the region as opposed to just a 
narrow consideration of the localist concerns of the Byram residents. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court disagreed, however, and sided with Byram 
area residents rather than Jackson’s growth and economic development realities. 
Ultimately, the Mississippi Supreme Court deemed the annexation a “tax grab,” 
unreasonable and unfair to the residents of the proposed annexation area.179 In a 
dissenting opinion, however, state Supreme Court Judge Prather defended 
Jackson’s position and built upon the lower court’s argument for a regionalist 
frame in applying the court’s reasonableness standard. 
Judge Prather recognized the importance of Jackson to the region and that its 
decline would have an adverse effect on the entire metropolitan region, including 
the proposed annexation area.180 His dissent displayed a keen awareness of the 
irony present in the Byram residents’ arguments, stating, “I find it ironic that 
                                                                                                                                      
 
annexation upon the voting strength of protected minority groups; (11) whether the property owners and 
other inhabitants of the areas sought to be annexed have in the past, and in the foreseeable future unless 
annexed will, because of their reasonable proximity to the corporate limits of the municipality, enjoy 
economic and social benefits of the municipality without paying their fair share of taxes; and (12) any 
other factors that may suggest reasonableness. Id. at 980. 
175 See, e.g., Magnolia Marine Transp. v. City of Vicksburg, 560 So. 2d 713 (Miss. 1990). 
176 See Byram I, 691 So. 2d at 983. 
177 See id. at 984 (Prather, J., dissenting). 
178 See id. at 988 (Prather, J., dissenting). 
179 See id. (Prather, J., dissenting). 
180 See id. at 990 (Prather, J., dissenting). 
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representatives of areas which have grown largely out of a desire to avoid taxation 
for the services which they enjoy in City of Jackson should accuse the City of 
attempting a ‘tax grab’ out of considerations of greed.”181 Judge Prather reminded 
the court that it was departing from its previously expressed concerns for the 
regional impacts of Jackson’s decline. In the earlier case of In re Extension of 
Boundaries of Jackson,182 the Mississippi Supreme Court found in favor of 
Jackson’s annexation proposal by interpreting Jackson’s long-range growth 
prospects as fitting the definition of its first index of reasonableness: the 
municipality’s need to expand.183 Judge Prather included in his dissent the court’s 
statement in that case that 
Jackson’s need for an expanded tax base is reasonable as well. As a matter of 
fact, recent years reflect a gradual recession of Jackson’s (economic) life blood 
to the various surrounding communities. These communities have experienced 
meteoric growth, most of them with a planned development. They have drained 
off and continue to drain off the life of the city’s flow of wealth in people, 
culture and dollars. Indeed, the very statistics recited by the Court below are the 
product of the flight of so many persons from Jackson’s corporate limits, not so 
far as to deprive themselves of full access to the economic, social and cultural 
benefits Jackson has to offer but only so far as to sever their relationship with 
Jackson’s assessor and tax collector. Barring a wholly unanticipated act of 
altruism by Ridgeland, Madison, Flowood, Pearl, Richland, Florence or 
Clinton—not to mention unincorporated western Rankin County, Jackson faces 
the certainty of a slow but sure erosion of its tax base by the unilateral actions of 
these selfish former citizens.184 
The Byram residents had legitimate concerns about Jackson’s ability to 
manage service delivery in the area proposed for annexation. The testimony 
presented in the case revealed that Jackson had arguably underperformed in the 
management of its resources.185 Jackson’s image as being worthy of the right to 
annex additional areas was also dogged by its past failure to furnish promised 
                                                           
 
181 See id. at 988–89. 
182 551 So. 2d 861 (Miss. 1989). 
183 See id. at 865. 
184 See Byram I, 691 So. 2d at 988 (Pranther, J., dissenting). 
185 See id. at 984 (discussing the testimony of the objectors’ expert who testified that the case 
represented the only instance where he found a county level of service in terms of street and right-of-
way maintenance that was noticeably better than that within the city). 
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improvements to areas annexed in 1976 and 1989.186 Several objective criticisms of 
Jackson’s ability to service additional areas were presented, and a common thread 
in state annexation regimes is the requirement that the annexing municipality be 
capable of extending its infrastructure and public services into an annexed area.187 
But service delivery concerns are incidental to broader considerations of regional 
interdependence and a social construction of municipal boundaries that ultimately 
pits communities within a region against each other. 
The 1997 Byram case was act one in the saga for Jackson’s expansion. In 
2009, the Mississippi Supreme Court again addressed the issue of Jackson’s 
expansion into the Byram area in City of Jackson v. Byram Incorporators (Byram 
II).188 The matter involved the combined case of the incorporation petition of the 
Byram area residents and another annexation petition by the City of Jackson. The 
“Byram Incorporators,” as the court referred to them, were attempting to 
incorporate Byram at the same time as Jackson was trying again to annex an area 
that included Byram. With regard to the annexation petition, the court again looked 
to its twelve indicia of reasonableness, considering each of them individually. The 
first factor is the city’s need for expansion.189 Within this specific category, the 
court has enumerated additional factors for consideration, including spillover 
development into the proposed annexation area, the municipality’s internal growth, 
the need to expand the municipality’s tax base, and limitations due to geography 
and environmental influences, among others.190 
Jackson asserted that its 2002 population density of 1,724.27 residents per 
square mile was high in relation to other Southern cities and that it only had fifteen 
to twenty percent vacant, developable land within its city limits.191 The court’s 
consideration of the city’s need to expand involved judgments on whether the city’s 
density afforded it enough land for future growth and whether the need for 
increased tax revenues was proportional to the size of the area the city sought to 
annex.192 Based on this analysis, the court upheld the lower court’s reduction in the 
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proposed area for annexation to what it considered to be in direct proportion with 
the city’s need to expand.193 
It is likely that Jackson’s arguments in the case limited the court’s 
consideration of the more significant growth considerations the court had 
previously acknowledged.194 Jackson’s arguments were more inwardly focused; 
they failed to adequately communicate the city’s position within a larger 
metropolitan region or the challenges its mid-size status presents for future 
economic development endeavors. Jackson argued that it was too dense, an 
argument that runs counter to the anti-sprawl logic that would also oppose regional 
fragmentation.195 While the city’s relative density is certainly informative for 
understanding land use patterns, it is less relevant in assessing how boundary 
expansion will enhance the economic health and competitive profile of not just 
Jackson, but the entire region. The city’s need for increased revenue is a more 
useful measurement, but even this factor requires context to have an impact. If the 
“need for increased revenue” justification for annexation is viewed in a zero-sum 
light where, in order for the city to win, the proposed area for annexation must lose, 
it loses its persuasiveness given the cultural draw of local autonomy in local 
government law. 
The “need for increased revenue” justification for annexation must be viewed 
in regionalist terms, which recasts annexation as a win-win scenario in which the 
annexed area benefits from the improved economic position of the central city. The 
court’s analysis in both cases fails to conceptualize Jackson as the economic 
development anchor for the areas both within and outside its borders. The court 
seems committed to viewing the factors impacting Jackson’s fate as being 
contained by its municipal boundaries as opposed to spilling over into the 
metropolitan region. 
Considering the judiciary’s primary function of dispute resolution within the 
context of the facts of a particular controversy, broader questions about urban 
policy and the externalities associated with municipal boundary reformations 
should be determined by the legislature. With no guiding philosophy on the role of 
local government expansion as related to a broader urban policy concern, 
Mississippi has abdicated these important urban policy and economic development 
matters to the litigation process. Of the twelve indicia of reasonableness the 
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Mississippi court deploys in reviewing challenges to municipal annexation, none of 
them directly addresses the prosperity of the metropolitan region. 
Recently, Jackson and Byram’s home county, Hinds County, embarked on a 
county-wide economic development marketing effort geared toward promoting the 
county as a whole.196 Developments like these signal that the Jackson metropolitan 
regional stakeholders are aware of their interdependence. In its 2010 annual report, 
Jackson reported a Moody’s bond rating of Aa2, which is relatively high.197 This 
strong financial indicator, in light of past boundary issues, runs contrary to Rusk’s 
thesis. It is likely, however, that Jackson’s relatively low regional growth rate 
between the 2000 and 2010 census reflects the consequences of entrenched 
fragmentation.198 
B. Tennessee 
Tennessee’s annexation statute differs considerably from Mississippi’s in both 
its procedural development and its expression of the role of annexation in 
municipal economic health and growth. Tennessee’s annexation statute provides, in 
relevant part, that an annexation will be deemed necessary not only when a 
majority of residents and property owners in the affected area present a petition, but 
also when it appears the “prosperity of the municipality will be materially retarded” 
without the annexation.199 This choice of statutory language implicitly recognizes 
the need for cities to expand and privileges those needs in a manner that could 
potentially outrank the will of private individuals to remain outside a particular 
city’s boundaries. This disposition bodes well for the cities and mid-size regions 
like Memphis and Nashville that are, to varying degrees, globally recognized for 
their cultural and historical assets but are still vying for competitive positioning 
with larger regions.200 
Tennessee’s annexation statute explicitly favors the growth of its largest 
municipalities by affording them priority in annexation contests. Where two 
                                                           
 
196 See Ruth Ingram, Marketing Message Unveiled for Hinds, CLARION LEDGER, July 22, 2011, at B1. 
197 See CITY OF JACKSON, COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR ENDED 
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198 See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
199 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-51-102 (2011). 
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municipalities incorporated in the same county seek to annex the same territory, the 
proceedings of the municipality having the larger population will have precedence 
and the smaller municipality’s proceedings will be held in abeyance pending the 
outcome of the proceedings of the larger municipality.201 Essentially, size matters 
in Tennessee’s annexation regime, and the state has determined that it wants to 
privilege those municipalities that, by virtue of scale, are likely best suited for 
continued growth and expansion. 
Tennessee’s current annexation statute is the result of the invalidation of a 
1997 annexation law that made it easier for small towns located on the urban fringe 
areas adjacent to larger cities to incorporate themselves rather than be annexed by 
the region’s central city.202 The 1997 law was struck down by the Tennessee 
Supreme Court in Tennessee Municipal League v. Thompson,203 after which the 
state legislature created a committee to rewrite the annexation law.204 The new 
annexation statute was hailed as a progressive step forward.205 It resulted in a 
broader Growth Management Law that had as its stated purpose “to direct the 
coordinated, efficient and orderly development of the local government and its 
environs that will, based on an analysis of present and future needs, best promote 
the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare.”206 The Growth Management 
Law (commonly referred to as the “Growth Policy Act”) directs each city and 
county to determine an urban growth boundary to guide its development.207 
                                                           
 
201 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-51-110(b). 
202 See 1997 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 98; Tenn. Mun. League v. Thompson, 958 S.W.2d 333, 334–35 (Tenn. 
1997) (discussing the background and construction of the annexation statute); Michael J. Stewart, 
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REV. 983, 987 (2000) (discussing the origins of Tennessee’s Growth Management Law and its relation 
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203 958 S.W.2d 333 (Tenn. 1997). 
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See Thompson, 958 S.W.2d at 334–35. 
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Management Law and its reception in the national planning community). 
206 See id. at 987–91; TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-58-107. 
207 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-58-104(a). 
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One of the aims of the Growth Policy Act is to eliminate the incorporation of 
unincorporated areas driven by the fear of being annexed by the central city, or 
what is known as defensive incorporation.208 Under the Growth Policy Act, a 
municipality possesses exclusive authority to annex territory located within its 
approved urban growth boundaries; therefore, no municipality may annex by 
ordinance or referendum any territory located within another municipality’s 
approved urban growth boundaries.209 The combined effect of Tennessee’s 
annexation statute and its Growth Policy Act statue incentivizes urban growth 
planning by tying a municipality’s annexation powers to the development of its 
growth plan.210 
Tennessee’s regard for the growth and prosperity of its municipalities is not 
only codified in the statutory language, but also in Tennessee courts’ interpretations 
of the annexation statute. Tennessee courts recognize a fairly limited level of 
judicial review in annexation cases, holding that annexation is a legislative matter 
that will not be disturbed by the court on review unless the legislative will can be 
shown to be arbitrary and unreasonable.211 In assessing whether an annexation is 
reasonable, Tennessee courts have acknowledged that there are always advantages 
and disadvantages to annexation, but ultimately if the court finds the advantages 
                                                           
 
208 See id. § 6-58-102(1)-(5). For a broader discussion of defensive incorporation, see Garnett, supra 
note 125, at 285–87. 
209 TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-58-111(a). 
210 See id. (“Within a municipality’s approved urban growth boundaries, a municipality may use any of 
the methods in chapter 51 [the annexation statute] of this title to annex territory; provided, that if a quo 
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annexation statute makes no provision for judicial review of annexations approved by a referendum 
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659 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983) (“Our annexation statutes expressly permit a court review 
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. . . . The court is of the opinion that there can be no judicial review of plaintiffs’ suit under T.C.A. 6-51-
103 (the reasonableness test) as such procedures only apply to annexation by ordinance cases. However, 
the court finds that the allegations of the complaint averring constitutional defects and infirmities in the 
adoption of the resolution and/or the election by referendum is reviewable.”). 
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and disadvantages of the annexation to be debatable, then it must rule in its 
favor.212 
In State ex rel. Collier v. Pigeon Forge,213 a case challenging the 
reasonableness of an annexation ordinance, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that 
the applicable test for determining whether an annexation is proper requires the 
consideration of all factors with the primary focus being on whether the ordinance 
was reasonable for the planned and orderly growth of the city.214 Pigeon Forge 
involved the annexation of an area lying in the growth pattern of Pigeon Forge, a 
small tourist-oriented city located in the foothills of the Smoky Mountains thirty 
miles Southeast of Knoxville.215 Pigeon Forge is several miles south of Sevierville, 
which is considered part of the Knoxville metropolitan region, the seventy-fifth 
largest MSA.216 
In reviewing the Pigeon Forge annexation, the court took into consideration 
its justifications for expansion, namely the need to guard against a “helter-skelter” 
development of commercial activities that may not be in harmony with those 
already in operation.217 The court even went so far as to state that the failure of a 
city to extend its corporate boundaries to embrace contiguous areas of growth and 
development is an abdication of its responsibility.218 In arriving at its decision to 
uphold the annexation, the court reviewed its previous statements on its theory of 
annexation. The court reaffirmed its contention that the appropriate theory of 
annexation recognizes it as a device by which a municipality may plan for its 
                                                           
 
212 See, e.g., State ex rel. Hicks, 513 S.W.2d 780 at 783. 
213 599 S.W.2d 545 (Tenn. 1980). 
214 See id. at 548. 
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orderly growth and development in a manner that “gives the city some control over 
its destiny.”219 
Tennessee courts have wrestled with challenges to the legitimacy of 
annexation efforts brought by those living in areas proposed for annexation. While 
Memphis, Tennessee, is neither the state’s capital nor its largest metropolitan 
region, it is arguably the state’s most renowned and symbolic metropolitan 
region.220 Memphis ranks second in population behind Nashville, the MSAs 
ranking numbers forty-one and thirty-eight, respectively.221 In Vollmer v. 
Memphis,222 the Tennessee Supreme Court’s reasonableness analysis incorporated 
factors affecting both the welfare of the affected residents and property owners, as 
well as the welfare of the municipality as a whole.223 
Vollmer involved a challenge to the reasonableness and constitutionality of an 
annexation ordinance brought by residents living in the area proposed for 
annexation.224 The court recognized that the annexation would place the affected 
citizens of the area on the tax rolls of Memphis, allowing them to pay for services 
they enjoy without cost, including parks, libraries, and public facilities financed 
and provided by the city.225 The court also took into consideration that the great 
majority of the residents in the affected area were employed in Memphis and 
commuted to Memphis in automobiles which did not then meet the emission 
standards required of automobiles owned by Memphis residents, surmising that 
compliance with the higher Memphis standards would ensure cleaner air for 
                                                           
 
219 See id. (citing City of Kingsport v. State ex rel. Crown Enters., 562 S.W.2d 808, 814 (Tenn. 1978)). 
220 Located on the Mississippi River, Memphis is internationally renowned as the home of Graceland, 
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citizens of the entire region.226 The court concluded its reasonableness analysis by 
stating that its concern for the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens and 
property owners of the area also included the citizens and property owners residing 
in the city of Memphis.227 
While the court in Byram II considered many of the same factors in 
evaluating the City of Jackson’s attempted annexation of the Byram area, it was 
constrained by a very thin annexation regime and common-law lineage which 
lacked any meaningful consideration of the impact of boundary reformations on 
regional prosperity. Tennessee’s annexation statute codifies the importance of 
annexation as urban policy in the plain language of the statute and creates parity 
between safeguards for citizens and municipalities. While Tennessee’s annexation 
regime is fairly open to interpretation by the courts, the courts themselves have 
adopted common-law standards that afford considerable deference to the express 
language in the enabling statutes. 
C. North Carolina 
North Carolina’s annexation regime has historically been hailed by many as a 
model urban policy that has contributed to the growth and economic development 
of its municipalities during the second half of the twentieth century.228 It is possible 
to connect the economic viability and attractiveness of North Carolina’s several 
dynamic metropolitan regions with its annexation law.229 The state’s annexation 
statute has its roots in the Municipal Government Study Commission, which was 
formed in 1958 in response to the concerns of the state’s leading municipalities. 
The Commission’s initial report declared that the periodic extension of municipal 
boundaries was essential for strong municipalities and the delivery of public 
services.230 The Commission declared that “cities cannot continue to remain strong 
and provide essential municipal services for sound development unless their 
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boundaries are periodically extended to take in those areas which require municipal 
services for sound development.”231 
North Carolina’s annexation statute contains two “Declaration of Policy” 
statements which communicate the values undergirding the state’s approach to 
municipal annexation for communities above and below the 5,000 population 
mark.232 The declaration specifically addresses metropolitan sprawl by plainly 
stating that sound urban development is essential to the continued economic 
development of North Carolina.233 For the state’s smaller municipalities, the statute 
states, 
[N]ew urban development in and around municipalities having a population of 
less than 5,000 persons tends to be concentrated close to the municipal boundary 
rather than being scattered and dispersed as in the vicinity of larger 
municipalities, so that the legislative standards governing annexation by smaller 
municipalities can be simpler than those for larger municipalities . . . .234 
For the state’s larger municipalities, the statute states, 
[N]ew urban development in and around municipalities having a population of 
5,000 or more persons is more scattered than in and around smaller 
municipalities, and that such larger municipalities have a greater difficulty in 
expanding municipal utility systems and other service facilities to serve such 
scattered development, so that the legislative standards governing annexation by 
larger municipalities must take these facts into account if the objectives set forth 
in this section are to be obtained.235 
The statute’s careful classification of small towns and large or growing 
municipalities exhibits a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between 
boundary expansion and urban development than that of Mississippi or Tennessee. 
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North Carolina’s statute gives broad authority to municipalities to extend their 
corporate limits to include contiguous and non-contiguous areas provided they are 
capable of providing public services to the annexed area in substantially the same 
manner as they are provided to the rest of the municipality.236 Previously, the 
statute specifically focused on the annexation of areas developed for “urban 
purposes.”237 Areas developed for “urban purposes” were defined according to 
specific characteristics such as density, spatial ordering, and intensity of 
subdivision, land use, and infrastructure support. North Carolina courts have held 
that for proposed annexations, the test for compliance is whether the proposed 
annexation “substantially complies” with the statute; literal compliance is not 
required.238 
Up and until the changes enacted in the 2012 legislative session, North 
Carolina provided for both voluntary and involuntary annexations.239 The state’s 
involuntary annexation provisions are credited for the policy’s success but also 
ignited a significant backlash.240 Involuntary annexation was only afforded to 
municipalities with more than 5000 residents.241 North Carolina courts adjudicating 
involuntary annexation disputes have long emphasized that in an involuntary 
annexation, municipal services must be extended to annexed areas in a 
                                                           
 
236 See id. § 160A-46; Davidson Cnty. v. High Point, 362 S.E.2d 553, 558 (N.C. 1987) (“A city, on the 
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municipality under the procedure set forth in this Part.”). 
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nondiscriminatory manner, meaning that annexed residents and property owners 
must receive substantially the same services that existing municipal residents and 
property owners receive.242 
Involuntary annexations were always required to satisfy specific requirements 
to prevent against arbitrariness annexations.243 The state’s careful consideration of 
granting municipalities unilateral power was evident in its urban-use-and-
subdivision test—an essential component of its former involuntary annexation 
provisions. The requirements stated that sixty percent of the property proposed for 
an involuntary annexation “must be developed for urban purposes.”244 It allowed 
non-urban land to be annexed as well, provided that it (1) laid between the 
municipal boundary and an area developed for urban purposes so that the area 
developed for urban purposes is either not adjacent to the municipal boundary or 
cannot be served by the municipality without extending services through a sparsely 
developed area, or (2) was adjacent, on at least sixty percent of its external 
boundary, to any combination of the municipal boundary and the boundary of an 
area or areas developed for urban purposes.245 
While North Carolina is generally comprised of small cities and towns—
where most annexations occur—it has several mid-size regions. The Charlotte and 
Raleigh MSAs exceed one million in population, but neither exceeds two 
million.246 Neither of these areas has seen the level of annexation litigation that the 
Asheville MSA has. Over the past fifteen years, at least seven cases involving 
disputes over involuntary annexation proceedings have been litigated in North 
Carolina courts, and of these cases, only one involved a city other than 
Asheville.247 
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The Asheville MSA ranks 117 with a 2010 population of 424,858 and grew 
more than fifteen percent between the 2000 and 2010 census.248 Asheville’s tax 
base grew 3.5% during the last quarter of 2009, which was credited mostly to 
annexations.249 Carolina Light & Power Co. v. City of Asheville250 illustrates how 
the state statute’s guiding intent plays out in annexation challenges. The case 
involved a dispute over whether lands lying between the municipality and the 
urbanized areas sought for development fell within the exception for annexing un-
urbanized lands articulated in the statute.251 
In explaining its reasoning, the court found that the legislative intent of the 
statute was to allow municipalities the opportunity to extend their services to reach 
urban core areas without being thwarted by intervening undeveloped land.252 
Involuntary annexation and the urban-use-and-subdivision test operationalized this 
intent. They ensured that central cities were able to quickly respond to growth 
patterns in a manner that protects their ability to maximize their quality of life and 
economic development prospects, with the recognition that as these factors 
improve for the central city, the entire metropolitan region benefits. 
North Carolina’s annexation statute specifically limits the scope of judicial 
review in annexation cases. State courts have acknowledged judicial review as 
being restricted to addressing whether the municipality followed statutory 
procedures and, if not, whether those in the annexed area will suffer material 
injury, and whether the annexed area meets statutory requirements.253 In spite of 
this, some courts have gone beyond addressing procedural disputes and ventured 
into interpreting statutory provisions.254 
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North Carolina’s involuntary annexation statutory provisions have caused 
considerable controversy, specifically because they are the most pro-municipality 
of such provisions among states that allow for involuntary annexation.255 After 
years of political battles over involuntary annexation, on June 18, 2011, the North 
Carolina legislature ratified House Bill 845, entitled “An Act to Reform the 
Involuntary Annexation Laws of North Carolina.”256 The legislation weakened the 
state’s annexation regime by allowing a majority of property owners in an annexed 
area to deliver a petition to the municipality’s governing board challenging the 
annexation. Additional changes followed in the 2012 legislative session. North 
Carolina House Bill 925 became law when the Governor refused to sign or veto the 
measure after the session.257 The legislation changed the annexation process to a 
referendum vote of the annexation area, effectively ending involuntary annexation 
in North Carolina. 
These developments are the culmination of a protracted fight to end 
involuntary annexation. The communities fighting involuntary annexation were 
wealthy, predominately white communities comprised of individuals who fled the 
central cities to live on their close-in periphery.258 While there are certainly a range 
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of motivations for relocating, the previously referenced history of metropolitan 
settlement patterns suggest that race and class likely played a role in motivating 
those in staunch opposition to involuntary annexation in North Carolina.259 The 
backlash provides yet another window into the race and class dynamics associated 
with the social construction of boundaries. 
It is important to note that race and class-based criticisms do not always cut in 
favor of involuntary annexation. Some argue that involuntary annexation results in 
bottom-line approaches that favor the annexation of wealthy areas while 
overlooking poorer areas where the cost to extend municipal services would exceed 
the amount of tax revenues received.260 While “cherry-picking” annexation should 
be restricted, it should not be used in a fashion that undermines the involuntary 
annexation regime entirely. By allowing municipalities to recapture wealthy out-
migration, it serves a redistributive function that ultimately benefits poorer 
residents. 
North Carolina’s metropolitan regions have grown and experienced economic 
development success during the period since the enactment of its progressive 
annexation regime. Between 1960 and 2010, the Raleigh MSA saw its population 
more than triple. Neighboring state capitals, however, did not see similar growth. 
Columbia, South Carolina, had a slight increase, while Richmond, Virginia, shrank. 
Those cities are significantly smaller than Raleigh, and their residents are poorer, 
based on personal income data.261 Additionally, Raleigh, Cary, Durham, Chapel 
Hill, Greensboro, High Point, Winston-Salem, and Charlotte have all earned the 
highest AAA bond ratings.262 
D. Annexation Lessons 
Involuntary annexation is what made North Carolina’s annexation regime a 
model for the nation. Tennessee benefits from a comprehensive urban growth 
boundary approach that privileges central cities in the annexation process. Both 
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states have better performing mid-size metropolitan regions than Mississippi, 
which lacks any comparable urban growth policy. 
State annexation regimes should include preferential treatment for mid-size 
central cities that risk being landlocked due to municipal incorporations on their 
peripheries. Such qualifications should take into consideration the metropolitan 
region’s population and demographic distribution, a relative assessment of the 
suburban incorporation threat in the region, the degree of social stratification, and 
how central city boundary expansion would meaningfully and measurably alter the 
economic development prospects for the metropolitan region. 
The effects of metropolitanization and its redefinition of the metropolis 
suggest that metropolitan residents may not be concerned with the municipal sub-
unit within which they reside. Therefore, annexation policy should seek to sever 
residential and political identities by reconstructing the legal geography of the 
metropolis.263 This has the potential to resolve both the external challenges of 
attracting economic development opportunities with the internal challenges of 
reducing social stratification. 
In addition to allowing for features such as involuntary annexation, a pro-
central city annexation regime must include clear, unambiguous policy positions on 
annexation as urban policy. Of the three, only Tennessee and North Carolina avow 
annexation’s role in ensuring prosperity, sound urban development, and curbing the 
effects of urban sprawl. Mississippi’s lack of an express urban policy focus in its 
annexation regime renders it at a significant disadvantage to its regional neighbors. 
CONCLUSION 
None of the challenges facing the modern American metropolis can be 
addressed on a municipality-by-municipality basis. Mid-size metropolitan regions 
are more acutely affected by increased intra-regional fragmentation and the 
corresponding lack of intra-regional economic development cooperation it can 
produce. In order to be competitive, metropolitan regions must leverage their 
strengths, maximize their economies of scale, and merge their assets into a unified 
regional economic and political unit. Therefore, the central cities of mid-size 
regions need annexation regimes that prioritize the elasticity of their boundaries 
and allow them to thwart fragmentation and the challenges it poses for the region’s 
competitiveness. 
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Annexation is certainly not a cure-all for the challenges facing mid-size 
regions. To the extent that a range of approaches is needed, annexation can be used 
as a short-term stopgap that will allow mid-size central cities the ability to stabilize 
their tax bases while making longer-term investments in creating meaningful, more 
robust regional governance structures. 
